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Book Review

Corporate Anatomy Lessons

David A. Skeel, Jr.t

The A natomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional
Approach. By Reinier Kraakman * et al. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004. Pp. 260. $85 . 00.

INTRODUCTION
Every ten years or so, a book is published that sets the terms of
discussion in corporate law scholarship for the years that follow. In 1 976,
Melvin Eisenberg published The Structure of the Corporation, I a work
that redefined how scholars and policymakers thought about the role of
the board of directors. Eisenberg' s model of the "monitoring board"-a
board that oversees the managers of a company instead of attempting to

t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to Henry
Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda, Reinier Kraakman, Stephen Lubben, Katharina
Pistor, and Harry Rajak for helpful comments; to Brian Nelson and the editors of The Yale
Law Journal for numerous insightful suggestions for improving the Review; and to the
University of Pennsylvania Law School for generous summer funding. This Review is
dedicated to the memory of Michael Whincop, who was a great friend, a rising star, and an.
important contributor to the literature discussed in the Review.
*
Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. M E LVIN A. EISENBERG, THE S TRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). The first in a
line of classic corporate law books, and still by far the most influential book ever written on
American corporate law, was AD OLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE P ROPERTY (1932), which identified the growing separation
between ownership and control in America's largest corporations. The most influential book in
the intervening years was a collection of essays, THE CORPORA nON IN MODERN SOCIETY
(Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
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run the business directly-continues to define our expectations of a
properly functioning board. Next came The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, which
reworked a series of their classic articles from the 1 9 80s. 2 Writing from a
law-and-economics perspective, Easterbrook and Fischel contended that
the principal task of corporate law is to limit the conflict of interest-or
"agency costs"-between managers and shareholders, and that American
corporate law facilitates this goal by providing a menu of default rules
the parties can alter by contract if they so choose. The most recent
addition to this pantheon was Mark Roe ' s 1 994 book, Strong Managers,
W eak Owners, which challenged the traditional assumption that the
emergence of America' s widely held corporations was dictated entirely
by economics. 3 In Strong Managers, Weak Owners, Roe noted that,
unlike American corporations, where shareholders are scattered and
rarely play a prominent role, German and Japanese firms are often
monitored by large shareholders such as banks and insurance companies.
He attributed the difference as much to politics-the traditional
American hostility to concentrated financial power-as to economics.
The book that will lay the groundwork for the corporate law debates
of the coming decade is The Anatomy of Corporate Law.4 Written by
seven of the world ' s leading corporate law scholars-Henry Hansmann,
Reinier Kraakman, and Ed Rock of the United States; Paul Davies of
England; Gerard Hertig of Switzerland; Klaus Hopt of Germany; and
Hideki Kanda of Japan The Anatomy of Corporate Law attempts to
identify the underlying structure of corporate law and to provide a
framework for understanding the wide range of approaches that different
countries take to corporate regulation. "What is the common structure of
the law of business corporations . . . across different national
jurisdictions?" the authors ask at the outset. s
It is hard to overstate the significance-and, as we shall see, the
success-of thi s project. Traditional comparative corporate law
scholarship has tended to explore the differences among jurisdictions in
intricate detail. The authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law insist that
-

2. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R . FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
(199 1 ) .

CORPOR ATE LAW

3. MARK 1. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF

( 1 994).
4. REINTER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPOR ATE LAW: A COMPAR ATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL ApPROACH (2004).
5. Id. at 1 .

AMERJCAN CORPORATE FINANCE

I
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these local vanahons are only that-variations on a single, common
theme. Throughout the book, they take a functional approach,
emphasizing the extent to which countries that seem to have very
different legal rules nevertheless tend to develop roughly similar
solutions to the characteristic problems of corporate law.
The central i ssue for corporate law in every jurisdiction, they argue,
is how to mediate three kinds of agency conflicts: between managers and
shareholders, between maj ority and minority shareholders, and between
the finn and third parties. To understand how different co-untries address
these competing claims, the authors develop a typology of ten different
strategies. The authors divide these strategies across two vectors : first by
operational criteria, categorizing each strategy broadly as either a
"regulatory" or a "governance" approach; then by temporal criteria,
separating strategies that operate ex ante from others that come into p lay
ex post. 6 Having developed their schema, the authors then apply it to
related party transactions, control transactions, investor protection, and a
variety of other key corporate law issues .
The great virtue of The Anatomy of Corporate Law is that its
typology of strategies provides a simple, user-friendly way to compare
the corporate law regimes of a wide range of different countries.
Although scholars will surely debate both the authors ' typology and their
claim that several basic agency cost problems lie at the heart of every
corporate law system, the essential framework is likely to withstand even
7
the most relentless scrutiny. Almost as remarkable as the typology itself
is the clarity and elegance of the analysis--especially given that the book
is the work of seven different scholars. The authors develop and apply
their typology in well under three hundred pages, a succinctness that
8
would fill the editors of that other anatomical guide, Gray 's A natomy,
with envy.

6. For readers who are already counting the parts of the typology, I should note that there
are two regulatory strategies and three governance strategies, each of which has both an ex
ante and an ex post version. This gives the typology its total of ten parts.
7. At a seminar at the London School of Economics in June 2003 that focused on the book
in anticipation of its publication, and for which I began thinking about the issues discussed in
this Review, the invited guests (roughly forty academics and top corporate lawyers) spent
much of the day trying to poke holes in the authors' typology and its emphasis on agency
costs-but without success.
8. Gray's Anatomy, the best·known general purpose medical handbook, comes in at
roughly six times the length of The A natomy o/Corporate Law. See GRAY'S ANATOMY (Peter
L. Williams et al. eds., Churchill Livingstone 37th ed. 1989).
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To say so much in so brief a compass, the authors obviously had to
exercise ruthless editorial judgment on what to include and what to omit.
After

describing

their

typology

and

exploring· several

of

their

applications, I spend much of this Review focusing on issues and
perspectives that the authors left out. At a general level, the book's most
important limitation is that it does not take its functionafist approach far
enough. Functional analysis, as the legal realists understood that term,
encompasses not only legal rules, but also norms, history, and social
context. Although the authors are careful not to limit themselves to the
"law on the books,"

The Anatomy of Corporate Law

focuses heavily on

legal regulation, and tends to give short shEift to these other factors. This
gives the book a somewhat ahistorical quality, and makes it seem

less

"functional" than one might expect. To borrow an analogy from the
world of art, it is as if the typology is drawn from casts of ancient
9
sculptures, rather than drawn from life.
The Review also argues that the book leaves out several crucial
facets of corporate law. The most important omission is the bankruptcy
or insolvency

regime.

In recent years, it has become increasingly

apparent that bankruptcY-Dr corporate reorganization-is best seen as a
component of corporate law. Indeed, I argue that it is impossible to
understand other corporate law issues without appreciating the role that
bankruptcy plays in shaping the incentives of managers and other
constituencies even while the corporation is financially healthy.
The

authors

also

omit

any

sustained

discussion

of

corporate

groups-that is, the parent-subsidiary arrangements that characterize
nearly every

large

corporation.

Although

the

authors

refer to

the

extensive regulations of corporate groups in Germany and elsewhere,
they have little to say about these regulations and do not offer any
analysis of the factors that influence a company's decision whether t o set
up a new business as a division within an existing corporation or to
locate the business in a separate corporation.
Finally, the authors do not fully consider the distinctive challenges of
corporate governance in emerging countries. Although they suggest that
the book's ten-part typology is relevant to any country, the authors'
analysis focuses on five notably developed jurisdictions-the United

9. "The beginner can at the very outset," the American artist Thomas Eakins said in
defense of his teaching philosophy in 1 881, "get more from the riving modef in a given time
than from study of the antique in twice that period" 1 LLOYD GOODRICH, THOMAS EAKINS
1 74 ( 1 982) (internal quotation marks omitted) .
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States, the United Kingdom, Germany , France , and Japan. In the
developing and transition nations whose corporate law has been a
particular concern in recent years, by contrast, it is important to move
beyond the typology in order to account for problems such as l imited
judicial enforcement.
Part I of the Review describes the authors ' typology and explores
some of the insights that emerge when they apply it to issues such as
self-interested transactions and the market for corporate control. Part I I
considers the limits o f the authors' functionalist approach and argues that
The Anatomy of Corporate Law should be seen as a prequel to , rather
than an extension of, important recent debates over the p o litic al
determinants of different corporate law regimes and the likelihood
that corporate law is converging around the world. Parts III-V then
discuss bankruptcy, corporate groups, and the special issues raised by
corporate governance in emerging nations. I offer the last three Parts as a
kind of friendly amendment (though an amendment that articulates my
own-perhaps at times conflicting-vision of corporate law) to the book.
These Parts can be seen as a plea that the authors add chapters on
bankruptcy and corporate groups to their book in the future, and that they
highlight the distinctive concerns of developing nations in its epilogue.
These additions are all it would take to make the anatomy complete .
I. THE BASIC ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW
The audacious goal of The Anatomy of Corporate Law is, in the
authors ' words, "to offer a common language and a general analytic
framework with which to understand the purposes that can potentially be
served by corporate law, and with which to compare and evaluate the
IO
efficacy of different legal regimes in serving those purposes." This
obj ective does not distill to a claim that the business corporations of
every country are, once we scratch beneath the surface a bit, identical.
Nor do the authors claim that the laws governing corporations are
heading in this direction, converging toward a single framework
(although several of the authors have made essentially this claim
elsewhere, and the book presents evidence of convergence in the five

10. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.

'"
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jurisdictions on which it focuses). I r The point, instead, is that
"corporations have a fundamentally similar set of legal characteristics
and face a fundamentally similar set of legal problems-in all
,
jurisdictions . , 12 The underlying template and the problems are the same;
the way they are addressed may be quite different.
After describing the basic attributes of the corporation in the first
chapter, the authors develop their typology-their common language and
general analytic framework-in chapter 2; they then spend the remainder
of the book applying it to a series of corporate law issues. To lay the
groundwork for the remainder of this Review, this Part adopts the same
strategy . I describe the authors ' account of the attributes- of the finn, and
summarize their ten-part typology and the agency problems to which it
responds . I then highlight some of the insights the book offers into the
key dilemmas of corporate law.
A. Tweaking the Traditional A ttributes ojthe Corporation
In the beginning is the corporation itself. The Anatomy oj Corporate
Law does not dwell on the reasons that businesses choose to incorporate
rather than use another enterprise form. The authors take it as a given
that the vast maj ority of large businesses are likely to be organized as
corporations or in an equivalent form, and that most small firms that are
held by more than two owners also adopt the corporate form.
What this means in practice, the authors argue, is that most
substantial firms have five basic characteristics in common: legal
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management
under a board structure, and investor ownership. The initial list of
attributes is to some extent familiar turf for anyone who has read a
corporate law treatise or taken a law school class on corporations in the
II. The strong view of convergence is defended in Hemy Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman,

The End of History for Corporate Law, 89

GEO L.J. 439 (2001). Another one of
.

the authors, Gerard Hertig, has taken a more cautious view, emphasizing the complexity of the
analysis and the need to take differences in actual enforcement into account. Gerard Hertig,

Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of Enforcement: A Comparison, in

CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark

J. Roe. eds., forthcoming 2004). Although
Anatomy of Corporate Law that the authors

Kraakman emphasizes in the preface to

The

"do not articulate a political economy of legal

convergence in corporate law," he also hastens to add that the "book as a whole offers
persuasive evidence of convergence across our major jurisdictions.
note 4, at vii.

12. KRAAKMAN ET AL.,

supra note 4,

at 1.

�

KRAAKMAN IT AL.,

supra
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last thirty or forty years. And its role is simply to serve as a springboard
for the authors ' most important innovation-the typology they will
develop and apply throughout the book. But even here, there are hints of
a new perspective. Rather than recycling the traditional five-factor
description of the corporation, the authors reshape both the attributes and
the overall account. 1 3
The two attributes that track the standard account most closely are
limited liability and transferabi lity . Limited liability-which means that
the shareholders of a corporation generally do not have any liability
beyond the capital they have contributed to the corporation in return for
their shares-is the attribute most laypeople associate with the corporate
form. Transferability refers to the fact that, so long as there are no
contractual restrictions, shareholders have the right to transfer their
shares, and this shift in ownership does not interfere with the existence or
operation of the corporation.
In the standard account, the authors' fourth attribute, "delegated
management under a board structure," would be labeled "centralized
management." Because corporations have limited liability and the
corporation does not dissolve if a shareholder dies or sells her shares, the
corporate form facilitated a division of labor between investors and
managers. In the United States, thi s division emerged most strikingly in
the nineteenth-century railroads, as chronicled by Alfred Chandler and
others. I4 By rechristening this attribute, The Anatomy of Corporate Law
underscores the significance of the board of directors as an intermediary
between shareholders and managers. IS Shareholders ordinarily have the
right to elect directors, but it i s the directors who choose and oversee the
managers. Thus, as the phrase "delegated management under a board

13. The traditional list of corporate attributes includes: limited liability, free transferability
of ownership interests, continuity of existence or "perpetual life," centralized management,
and entity status. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, COR PORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZAnONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 100 (8th ed. unabr. 2000) (listing and describing
these five attributes).
14. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: T HE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (describing the emergence of middle managers
and a hierarchical structure in American business).
15. "Manager" is a somewhat slippery term in the corporate world. In the conventional
definition, which I adopt here, managers are the executives who run the corporation on a day
to-day basis. The firm's highest-level executives, such as the chie f executive officer (CEO)
and the chief financial officer (CFO) , often serve on the board as well and are referred to as
"inside directors" in that capacity. Thus, there is often an overlap between a company's
managers and its directors.
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1 5 26

[Vol. 1 1 3: 1 5 19

structure" suggests, the directors are the crucial lillk between
shareholders and the decisionmaking authority that shareholders
implicitly delegate to the day-to-day managers .
The authors have created "investor ownership," the fifth
characteristic in their initial list of attributes, out of whole cloth. In the
traditional recitation, the fifth attribute would be continuity of interest or
"perpetual" life-the fact that, so long as they keep making money and
paying their debts, corporations are eternal. Why omit perpetual life?
Presumably, the authors concluded that the permanence of the corporate
form is already captured in the concept of legal personality, and thus that
continuity of interest wouldn' t be missed (save, perhaps, by a few
corporate law scholars who have a deep attachment to the traditional
incantation). One cannot help but imagine that Henry Hansmann (who
not co incidentally is one of the coauthors of the initial chapter) was the
one who dropped perpetual life and slipped "investor ownership" into the
mix. Hansmann is the author of an extremely important book on the
choice among different enterprise forms. I6 The emphasi s on investor
ownership is designed to highlight the fact that the shareholders of a
corporation enj oy b oth the right to control the firm and the right to
receive the firm ' s net earnings. In other enterprise forms, either or both
of these rights may be missing. 1 7
I have saved the first attribute, legal personality, for last because it
has received by far the most attention in the recent literature and will
figure prominently in my analysis later in the Review. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, the nature of corporate
personality was hotly debated by European, and then American,
corporate scholars. The principal question was whether corporations are
"real" entities, with a philosophically separate existence, or whether they
are simply aggregations of shareholders or artificial entities that owe
their powers entirely to the state. I8 From a twenty-first-century vantage
point, the debate is excruciating; it is the corporate law equivalent of the
16. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
17. In a limited partnership, for instance, the limited partners have the right to receive the
partnership's net earnings but cannot take part in the control of the partnership. See, e.g.,

EISENBERG, supra note

13, at 480-90.
18. For an excellent analysis of the debate as it played out in the United States, see

MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY

68 (1992). Horwitz argues that the "natural entity" view figured

prominently in the legitimization of large-scale corporate enterprise in the late nineteenth
century.
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medieval quarrels over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Indeed, the debate is often viewed as having ended when the pragmatist
philosopher John Dewey published an article in this j ournal arguing that
the various views collapsed into each other, and each could be used to
support any outcome on a particular issue. 19 Certainly, we should be
careful not to understate the significance of the opposing views. In the
United States, the persistence of the natural entity theory has contributed
to the legal treatment of corporations as "persons" that are entitled to
constitutional protections such as free speech rights-as well as subject
to criminal liability for their acts. But most corporate law scholars simply
took corporate personality for granted for decades after the philosophical
debate petered out.
In the past five years, two of the authors of The A natomy of
Corporate Law, Hansmann and Kraakman, have put corporate
personhood back on the scholarly radar screen by arguing (on economic
rather than philosophical grounds) that corporate personality is the single
most important attribute of the corporate form. The key attribute of
corporate personhood, in their view, lies in two protections that ·they
,
refer to collectively as "affirmative asset partitioning., 20 The first
protection is priority status for creditors of the corporation. Corporate
law underscores the separate existence of the corporation by giving
corporate creditors first dibs on its assets; only after they have been paid
are creditors of the corporation ' s shareholders entitled to share in the
assets. In effect, this treatment segregates the company ' s assets and as a
result enables creditors to monitor more effectively. The second
component of corporate personhood, liquidation protection, assures that
individual shareholders "cannot withdraw their share of firm assets at
will, thus forcing partial or complete liquidation of the firm , nor can the
personal creditors of [a shareholder] foreclose on the [shareholder's]
,, 21
share of firm assets.
Liquidation protection diminishes the risk that a
company ' s going-concern value will be destroyed as the result of
financial grabs by shareholders or their creditors.

19. John Dewey,

The Historic Background a/ Corporate Legal Personality,

35 YALE L.J.

655 (1926).

20. Hansmann and Kraakrnan develop their theory in Henry Hansmann & Reinier

Kraakrnan,

The Essential Role 0/ Organizational Law,

110 YALE LJ. 387 (2000), and Henry

Hansmann, Reinier Kraakrnan & Richard Squire, Legal Entities, Asset Partitioning, and the
Evolution of Organizations (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
21. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note

4, at 7.
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What makes affinnative asset partItIOning especially important is
that the parties could not realistically create it themselves. All of the
other attributes theoretically could be replicated through contractual
provisions (just as the attributes can be, and often are, altered or
eliminated by contract). But it would be nearly impossible to achieve
affinnative asset partitioning by contract, due to the huge number of
actual and potential parties involved (which would include every creditor
22
of every current or future shareholder of the enterprise)_ As a result, it
is here that the corporate fonn, as supplied by the state, plays its most
important role.
Although the description of corporate personhood in The Anatomy of
Corporate Law is drawn directly from Hansmann and Kraakman's work,
it p lays little role in the analysis of the book. The authors quickly leave
this and the other attributes of the corporation behind. They take the
existence of the finn and its boundaries as a given throughout the book,
and focus on the relationships among the principal parties within an
established finn. As we shall see, it is unfo rtunate that the corporate
boundary issues leave almost no further trace on the analysis; the choice
of boundaries, as it turns out, is an essential part of the anatomy of
corporate law?3
B . The Typology at the Heart afCorporate Law
1.

The Three-Headed Problem ofAgency Costs

Having dispensed with corporate law ' s initial function, establishing
and defining the parameters of the corporate fonn, the authors go on to
develop the typology that governs the remainder of the book. This entire
typology is based on a startlingly simple claim: The authors argue that
the chief end of corporate governance is to control the inevitable
conflicts of interest that arise among the principal constituencies of the
corporation-nothing more, nothing less. These conflicts fall into three
general categories: conflicts between the corporation ' s shareholders and
22.

See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note

20, at 410-12, 429. John Armour and Michael

Whincop argue that another important role of corporate law is to establish the authority
structure that governs the relationships among various constituencies of the firm. John Armour

& Michael 1. Whincop, The Proprietary Structure of Corporate Law (Aug. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
23.

See infra

corporate groups).

Part IV (reintroducing asset partitioning to analyze boundary issues and

---

#'
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its managers; between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders; and between the cOIJloration and contracting parties such
as creditors, employees, and customers .
As is customary in the cOIJlorate governance literature, the authors
refer to these conflicts as "agency" or "principal-agent" problems. These
kinds of problems, they note, "arise[] whenever the welfare of one party,
termed the 'principal, ' depends on actions taken by another party, termed
,
the' agent. " 24 In layperson's terms, whenever one party acts on behalf of
another, there is a risk that he will pursue his own interests rather than
those of the other party.
For American readers, the most familiar of these problems is the
first: the potential conflict between shareholders and the company's
managers and directors . Although the directors (and through them, the
managers) are representatives of the shareholders (and sometimes of
other constituencies as well) , they may pay more attention to protecting
their j obs, benefits, or the privileges of running the business than to the
best interests of the shareholders and the company. The problem can be
particularly acute if-as has traditionally been the case in the United
States, and more recently the United Kingdom as well-shareholdings
25
are diffuse.
If, by contrast, some of the shareholders hold significant blocks of
stock-as is often the case in continental Europe and Japan-the authors'
second category of potential conflict arises: Blockholders may use their
influence to direct benefits to themselves at the expense of the
company ' s other, scattered shareholders. These blockholders , who may
be members of a controlling family or a financial institution such as a
bank, may contract with the company on attractive terms or use the
company' s assets as their own.
The authors ' final category of conflict arises out of the fact that the
company (at the behest of its owners or managers) may exploit one or
more of the other constituencies with whom it contracts' by shifting

24. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2L
25. Identifying this problem, which they referred to as the separation of ownership from
control, was the central insight of Berle and Means's landmark book The Modern Corporation
and Private Property. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1 . In recent decades, institutional
shareholders such as mutual and pension funds have become major stockholders in most large
U.S. corporations, and they hold even larger stakes in U.K. companies. See, e.g . , Bernard S.
Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation, 92 MICH. L REv. 1997 (1994).
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excessive risk to its creditors, mistreating its employees, or deceiving the
consumers who buy its products.
The authors ' claim that addressing these three agency problems is
the single overriding objective of corporate law is certain to generate
fierce debate. As noted earlier, at a full-day seminar celebrating the book
in June 2003, a group of commentators and participants repeatedly
questioned whether this is the proper lens through which to view
corporate governance. 2 6 Although the participants. agreed that
relationships among the various constituencies are the central issue in
corporate law, there was far less consensus on whether the agency cost
notion is the best way to analyze these relationship s . Two of
the counterproposals will give the flavor of the initial debate.
One commentator, Jonathan Rickford, suggested that the real issue
in corporate governance is not so much agency problems as control
rights-that is, the proper allocation of powers among the various
constituencies of the corporation. The issue, he argued, consists of
questions such as what issues should be within the shareholders '
prerogative , how authority should be divided b e tween the corporation ' s
managers and its board (or boards) o f directors, and how much influence
employees should have over corporate decisionmaking. Although the
authors acknowledged the importance of control rights-and the
roles that both law and private contract play in allocating corporate
power-they argued that the underlying goal of such an allocation is to
minimize agency costs. Manager control is often overridden, for
instance , in contexts such as takeovers, where managers have a
particularly strong incentive to favor their own interests at the expense of
shareholders and the firm.
A second debate centered on the term "agency" itself. Rather than
principal-agent relations , several participants insisted, the relationships
among the constituencies of the corporation are promissory in nature .
Managers and employees are subject to employment contracts , and
creditors and customers have their own contractual relations with the
company. Most of these relationships do not fit the traditional agency
paradigm of a principal transferring control over the res of a trust to an
agent, the trustee, who acts on the principal's behalf. In response, the
authors emphasized that the conception of "agency" employed by The
Anatomy of Corporate Law is the economists ' more general conception

26.

See supra note 7.
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of principal-agent relations (a usage that i s now standard in the corporate
law literature as well, as noted above), rather than the traditional,
doctrinal legal definition. One of the authors, Paul Davies, also pointed
out that many corporate relationships are more dependency-based than
truly promissory in nature-that is, the promisor-promisee paradigm is
too narrow to capture many aspects of corporate law, such as directors'
fiduciary duties to shareholders or the corporation's environmental
obligations.
Each of these issues can be expected to resurface as scholars grapple
with the insights of the book, and there will be additional debates as
well-for example , given that agency cost analysis tends to be economic
in its focus, future commentators are likely to argue that The A natomy of
Corporate Law does not place enough emphasis on social or moral
concerns. Yet the book's analysis does not preclude these considerations,
and its authors make a powerful argument that the choices made in any
given jurisdiction will have predictable economic consequences,
consequences that are best seen in agency cost terms.
By the end of the London seminar, the authors' claim that agency
costs lie at the heart of corporate law had withstood even the most
aggressive pummeling. I strongly suspect this will be the case in the
broader corporate governance literature as well. At least for the
developed economies that are the authors' principal focus, agency
conflicts are precisely the right starting point. 27
2.

The Ten-Category Typology of Corporate Governance

It is here that the anatomy lessons truly begin. The Anatomy of
Corporate Law divides all of corporate law into a total of ten different
strategies for protecting principals from expropriation by corporate
28
double agents. These strategies fall into two general categories, four of
which the authors refer to as "regulatory strategies," and six that are
characterized as "governance strategies." Let me begin by describing the

27. For a discussion of the very different issues raised in the context of developing
economies, see Part V.

28. Given that there are three different kinds of agency problems, the identities of the
principal and agent will vary in the three contexts. Shareholders are the principal, and
managers the agents, in the first type of agency problem; minority shareholders are the
principal, and controlling shareholders the agent, in the second; and various third parties are
the principal, and the corporation (or its owners) the agent, in the last.
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two general categories, then turn to the strategies within each category. A
29
table of the entire schema i s included below.
TABLE 1 . STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING PRINCIPALS

Rules

Entry

Selection

Initiation

Trusteeship

Standards

Exit

Removal

Veto

Reward

Regulatory strategies have a prescriptive quality. They impose direct
performance requirements on the agent, and they set the terms for
forming or dissolving the principal's relationship with the company.
Governance strategies, by contrast, focus more on the ongoing principal
agent relationship; the goal of these strategies is to "protect principals
indirectly, either by enhancing their power or by molding the incentives
,,
of their agents . 30 Provisions restricting the right of a manager or
controlling shareholder to enter into contracts with the corporation are an
example of the "regulatory" approach, whereas shareholders' authority to
vote on directors and certain major transactions is a governance strategy .
W ithin each of the maj or categories, the authors refine the strategies
further by making a series of additional distinctions . Start with the
regulatory strategies . The authors identify two types of regulatory
strategies, which they characterize as "agent constraints" and "affiliation
terms." By "agent constraints," the authors have in mind provisions that
define the parameters of permissible agent conduct. Dividend restrictions
are an illustration of an agent constraint, since they limit the ability of the

29. The schema is outlined in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra
authors' overview is succinct,
the description that follows.

30. Jd. at 23.

note 4, at 23-28. Because the
I will not refer to specific page numbers for the ten strategies in
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company (the agent) to disburse dividends, in order to protect a principal
(here, the creditors) who could be hurt by excessive dividends. Whereas
agent constraints focus on the agent's midstream conduct, "affiliation
tenns" dictate the tenns on which the principal (that is, shareholders)
begin or end their relationship with the agent. Perhaps the most familiar
affiliation tenn is the set of mandatory disclosure requirements that
provide infonnation to investors who are deciding whether or not to buy
a company' s stock.
As a final refinement of the regulatory strategies discussion, the
authors distinguish between agent constraints and affiliation tenns that
operate ex ante, and those that come into play ex post. The authors refer
to ex ante agent constraints, such as the dividend restrictions mentioned
in the previous paragraph, as "rules," and to ex post agent constraints,
such as judicial scrutiny of whether the managers have fulfilled their
fiduciary duties, as "standards ." With affiliation tenns, ex ante tenns
govern the parties' entry into an agency relationship and are called,
appropriately enough, "entry" tenns; "exit" tenns regulate tennination of
the relationship. Mandatory disclosure obligations are a common· entry
tenn, and appraisal rights-which pennit shareholders to insist that the
company buy back their shares under certain circumstances-focus on
exit tenns.
Lawmakers thus have a total of four regulatory strategies in their
arsenal : two agent constraints (rules and standards) and two affiliation
tenns (entry and exit).
Tum now to the governance strategies. Here, the authors identify
three different strategies, which they call "appointment rights," "decision
rights," and "agent incentives." An appointment right is the principal ' s
right to appoint o r remove the relevant agent. The most familiar
illustration of this strategy is shareholders' right to vote on the
corporation ' s directors. Decision rights give the principal similar powers
with respect to particular transactions, as when shareholders have the
right to approve or reject a proposed merger or amendment of the
company's charter. Agent incentives are strategies- that are designed
either·to minimize the self-interest of the decisionrnaking agent (as with
a requirement that only disinterested directors vote on a transaction
involving one of the other directors) or, alternatively, to align the agent' s
incentives with those of the principal, thus harnessing the agent's self
interest (as when managers are given performance-based compensation).
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Each of the three governance strategies also comes in either an ex
ante or an ex post variety. The authors refer to ex ante appointment rights
as "selection" rights; an example of these is the right of shareholders to
vote on the company's directors . The authors refer to the ex post version
as "removal" rights; an example of these is ousting a director, which
sometimes requires a showing of cause and sometimes does not. With
decision rights, the ex ante strategy is the right of "initiation," while ex
post decision rights are referred to as a "veto" power. Thus, shareholders
are generally given the authority to initiate a few transactions, such as
bylaw changes in the United States, and shareholders have the authority
to veto (or approve, if they so choose) maj or transactions" such as
mergers or sales of most or all of the corporation's assets. Finally, the
authors divide agent incentives into ex ante "trusteeship" strategies and
ex post "reward" strategies. They point to disinterestedness requirements
and nonlegal constraints on agent perfonnance such as conscience and
professional pride as examples of the trusteeship strategy. High-powered
incentives such as perfonnance-based pay , on the other hand, operate as
"rewards . "
Added together, there are a total of six strategies on the governance
side of the ledger: a pair of appointment rights strategies (selection and
removal), a pair of decision rights approaches (initiation and veto), and a
final pair of agent incentives (trusteeship and reward) .
That ' s it. Much as linguists have long sought to identify the deep
structure of language, the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law
offer their ten-part schema as a complete map of corporate law. These
ten strategies are the tools that lawmakers use to keep the three different
kinds of agency problems in check. Although I argue in Parts III V for a
broader application of the anatomical framework, the schema itself
elegantly captures the full range of corporate law strategies. Nothing is
mlssmg.
-

C . The Typology in Action
Having defined the attributes of a corporation and developed their
ten-part typology of legal strategies in the first chapter, the authors of
The Anatomy of Corporate Law proceed to apply it to a series of key
corporate law issues in chapters 3 through 8 , before summarizing their
findings and conclusions in chapter 9. To complete this overview of the
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book, let me briefly describe the maj or substantive chapters and some of
the insights of each.
In chapter 3, the authors provide an overview of the strategies in
action, exploring some of the ways in which they are actually
implemented. The authors point out, for instance, that each of their five
principal jurisdictions-the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany , France, and Japan-gives shareholders a broad right of
appointment, 3 l and that U . S . corporations tend to rely more heavily on
the reward strategy (by paying managers in stock and stock optionsJ than
corporations elsewhere. 32 Examining conflicts between controlling and
minority shareholders, they note that cumulative voting is the most
common appointment rights strategy used to protect minority
33
shareholders. With regard to the agency problem between the company
and nonshareholder constituencies, the authors focus most extens ively on
the decision whether to give employees representation on a company' s
board of directors ( a selection strategy). The fact that this strategy is rare
except where mandated by law-as in Germany and the Netherlands
suggests , they argue , that the costs of employee representation (such as
divisiveness on the board) exceed its benefits. 34
Chapter 4 addresses creditor protection measures such as minimum
capital and dividend rules. After noting some of the standard
justifications for creditor protections , the authors focus on th e use of
entry requirements (in particular, mandatory disclosure) and the two
agent constraints-rules and standards. The United States imposes the
most extensive disclosure requirements for large corporations , whereas
Japan and European countries are stricter with small corporations. 35 The
authors find striking differences in the use of legal capital rules such as
the requirement that corporations maintain a minimum amount of capital.
Minimum capital rules have gone the way of the dodo in the United

3 l . Id. at 44-46.
32. Id. at 5 l .
3 3 . Id. at 54-55. With cumulative voting, each shareholder is given a number of votes
equal to the number of shares she owns, mUltiplied by the total number of directors who will
be elected. Rather than voting on each directorial slot individually, as is done with traditional
voting, shareholders can spread their votes over as few or as many candidates as they like.
Because it enables minority shareholders to stack their votes on a sma[J number of candidates,
cumulative voting increases the likelihood that they can elect at least one of the directors. For
discussion, see, for example, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New
Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 24 ( 1 994).
34. K.RAAKMAN ET AL, supra note 4, at 64.
3 5 . Id. at 79, 81.
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States, but figure prominently in continental Europe.
speculate that the prominence of these

36
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The authors

requirements in continental

Europe may stem from the fact that these are civil law systems (which
rely more on strict rules and less on judicial discretion) and that banks
are central to corporate governance in these countries. Although the
differences in the formal rules of the five principal jurisdictions are stark,
the authors conclude that this starkness is so mewhat misleading. In
practice,

the

disclosure

rules

function

relatively

similarly

across

j urisdictions , for instance, and the authors suggest that Europe's legal
37
cap i tal rules may be eroding somewhat.
In chapter

5,

the authors take up related-party transactions, which

they define to include self-dealing transactions between the company and
one of its managers, compensation issues, the usurpation of corporate
opportunities, and insider trading. The most common strategies for
addressing these issues, they argue , include trusteeship strategies such as
approval by disinterested directors, shareholder decision rights such as
the right to approve or veto a transaction, and ex post judicial review
(the "standards" form of agent constraint) .

Disclosure requirements

figure less prominently in continental Europe than in the United States
and the United Kingdom, a difference the authors attribute to the
ownership structure of European firms. Because they tend to have large,
well- informed shareho lders, disclosure may be less important in these
38
countri es than would be the case if shareho lders were more diffuse.
Chapter

6

explores the treatment of significant corporate actions such

as mergers, assets sales , stock repurchases , and the issuance of debt. The
authors argue that regulatory intervention is likely in each of the
principal jurisdictions when at least one, and ordinarily all, of the
fo l lowing three conditions are met:
at stake;

(2)

decision

whether to

(1)

There is a large amount of money

the issue in question is similar to shareholders ' initial
invest,

and thus

competent to assess for themselves; and

is one that shareh olders are

(3)

self-interest is likely to cloud
39
Although the regulatory

the managers ' decisionmaking perspective .

36. Id. at 84. For a scathing criticism of the legal capital rules used by many European

countries, see Luca Enriques & Jonathan

R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The
Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1 1 6 5 (2001). Although
chapter 4 points out that the rules can be costly, the authors are not as skeptical as Enriques
and Macey of their value.

37. KRAAKMAN ET AL.,

38.
39.

Id.
Id.

at 1 29.
at l 3l .

supra

note 4, at 98-99.
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strategies vary, shareholder decision rights play a particularly prominent

role,40 and they are coupled in the United States and the United Kingdom

with reliance on judicially enforced fairness standards.41 Shareholders are
given the right to veto large mergers, even when they hold shares in the

i'

acquirer rather than the target , the authors argue, because all three
prerequisites are met.4 2 None of the principal j urisdictions requires
shareholder approval of a management decision to issue a large amount
of debt, on the other hand, because the decision does not dovetail with

shareholders ' expertise and because managers ' borrow i ng decisions are
not systematically tainted by self-interest.43
Chapter

7

offers a penetrating analysis of jurisdictions' very different

treatment of another issue, takeover regulation. The key regulatory issue
with takeovers, the authors argue, is "the allocation of decision

rights

on

the offer, more particularly, the division of decision rights as between the
,,
target shareholders and target board. 44 The authors distinguish between
the U.K. model, which limits managers ' ability to interfere with a
takeover offer, and the U . S . model, which gives the board of directors
broader authority to determine whether or not an offer will make its way
to the shareholders.4 5 Although the other principal jurisdictions fall
somewhere in between, most lean toward the U.K.

model , which

emphasizes shareholder decisionmaking and takes a dimmer view of
directors ' faithfulness to shareho lders ' interests.46 The authors also point
out that affiliation rules such as mandatory disclosure are particularly
important in the management buyout context, because inside bidders
have less incentive than a competitive bidder to produce information
about the company.
In chapter

8,

which addresses "issuers and investor protection," the

authors focus on mandatory disclo sure rules. Thus, unlike the preceding
chapters, which apply the ten-part schema to particular sets of corporate
law issues, this last major chapter homes in on a single governance
strategy : the use of mandatory disclosure as an "entry" requirement.

40. ld. at 13 3-34.
41. ld. at 135.
42. ld. at 134.
43. ld. at 152-53.
44. Id. at 163.
45. Id. at 164. Managerial agency costs are constrained under this model by fiduciary duty
and reward strategies. !d. at 168.
46. See id. at 1 70 (noting the prevalence of the U.K. model); id. at 189 (discussing [he
effects of the two models).
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After

rehearsing

the

arguments

for

why

[Vo l.

mandatory

1 13: 1519

disclosure

is

necessary-that is, why companies are unlikely to provide enough
47
information to investors unless they are required to do so _the authors
note that the level of disclosure that is required often varies with the
sophistication

of the

likely

investor.

Although

roughly

the

same

di sclosure approaches are used in all five principal jurisdictions, the
comprehensiveness of the required disclosure varies, with the most
extensive disclosure obligations coming in the most developed markets
48
Anatomy's authors are
(the United S tates and the United Kingdom) .
agnostic on the reason for this. They suggest that perhaps developed
markets

need

to

protect

a

large

number

of

relatively

small ,

unsophisticated investors i n their midst, o r perhaps interest groups such
as

lawyers

and

securities

analysts,

which

benefit

from intrusive
49

regulation, are responsible for the higher level of enforcement.
Chapter

9

wraps up the book (and puts a bow on it, as it were) by

briefly summarizing the authors ' findings and suggesting el even avenues
for future research. Scholars should "expl ore further the fundamental
issue of how far corporate law successfully complements or supplements
5o
market institutions" such as credit-rating agencies, for instance ;
they
, 51
should "investigate the trade-offs in regulatory strategies , ;
and they
should examine differences (such as the choice between mandatory and
s2
default rules) in "regulatory technique . "
Although the framework is
, 53
designed to "transcend[] particular jurisdictions, ,
the authors ' principal
focus is on developed economies. "An eleventh and final area of
rese arch," they conclude, is "to examine to what extent and with which

47. The issue of whether mandatory disclosure rules are necessary was the subject of
extensive debate in the 1 980s and early 1 990s. The classic works were those of John C.
Coffee, Jr. , and Easterbrook and Fischel. See John C. Coffee, Jr. , Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 7 1 7 ( 1 9 84) (contending
that analysts have inadequate incentives to ferret out all relevant information and that
companies would engage in underdisclosure absent mandatory disclosure obligations); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors,
70 VA. L. REv. 669 (I 984) (arguing that companies would have an incentive to disclose even
in the absence of mandatory rules).
48. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 1 2- 1 3 .
49. Id. at 2 1 3 - 1 4.
50. Id. at 222 (emphasis omitted).
5 1 . Jd. at 223 (emphasis omitted).
5 2 . Id. at 224. These are the first, second, and fourth avenues for future research,
respectively.
5 3 . Jd. at 225.
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amendments our analytical framework can b e used to deal with emerging
,,
jurisdictions issues. 54
D.

A Few Concluding Words
In a book written by seven different authors, who teamed up in

shifting combinations to write the individual chapters ,55 there is an
obvious risk that the tone and emphasis will careen wildly from one
perspective to another. Yet to a remarkab le extent,

Corporate Law

The Anatomy of

reads as if it were written by a single author.56 It has the

same clear, streamlined tone throughout. The authors make a comp elling
case that delegation and its resulting agency problems are the central
governance issues in large-scale corporate enterprise. Their typology also
neatly captures the range of strategies that can be found in the corporate
laws

of

every

jurisdiction,

no

matter

how

widely

divergent

the

approaches may look at first glance . It takes no great act o f imagination
to predict that the book's ten-p art anatomy will soon become the lingua
franca of corporate law discourse. Corporate law scholars and reformers
may disagree on everything else, from the treatment of employees to the
best approach to regulating corporate takeovers . But this is the language
that all of them will be using,
I I . THE

ROAD NOT TAKEN : HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CONVERGEN CE

As should be clear from the overview we have just completed, one of
the great virtues of
emphasis

on the

The Anatomy of Corporate Law

function,

rather than the

form,

is the authors '

of the

corporate

governance approaches used in different jurisdictions. 5 7 Comparative

54. Id. at 226, This eleventh avenue of further research was added in response to an earlier
version of this Review. Part V can thus now be seen as a more detailed consideration of the
relationship between the authors' schema and the governance problems of developing and
transition nations.

5 5 . The principal authors of each chapter are listed at the outset of the chapter. One effect
of this format is to invite readers to search for the distinctive perspectives of the individual
authors, a sport in which I engage on several occasions in the discussion that follows.

56. This no doubt stems at least in part fro m the role Reinier Kraakmarr played as lead

author, as reflected in his authorship of the preface and coauthorship of the first three chapters.

57. Here and throughout the Review, I use the term "corporate governance" broadly, to
refer to the ten strategies as a group. Corporate governance thus includes both the governance
and the regulatory strategies outlined in the authors' schema. 'It also includes nonlegal
i.nfluences on corporate decisionmaking, such as norms.

- [VoL 1 1 3 : 1 5 1 9

The Yale Law Journal

1 540

analysis of corporate law can quickly bog down in the intricacies of the
regulations of any given country. The difficulties become still more acute
if the comp aratist tries to account for all of the related areas (such as
employment or commercial law) that can have an important effect on
corporate

governance.

jurisdictions,

By

emphasizing

The Anatomy of Corporate Law

the

similarities

among

cuts through the Gordian

knot of difference and provides a basis for comparing and critiquing the
corporate governance approach of any country or countries.
But just what does the authors ' functionalism include? The authors
sidestep

this

question.

Rather

than

defining

what

they

mean

by

"functional," they
simply note that the exigencies of commercial actIVIty and
organization

present practical

problems

that

have

a rough

similarity in developed market economies throughout the world,
that corporate law everywhere must necessarily address these
prob lems, and that the forces of logic, competition, interest
group pressure, imitation, and compatibility tend to lead different
jurisdictions
58
problems.

to

choose

roughly

simi lar

solutions

to

these

As it plays out in the book, the authors ' functionalism is li mited in
two important respects. First,

The A natomy of Corporate Law

does not

offer any general theory as to how the various elements of its typology fit
together. The authors make a number of scattered generalizations about
lawmakers ' use of the ten strategies-they point out in chapter

2

that

most jurisdictions rely more on standards than on rules to police
intracorporate transactions, for instance, 59 and in chapter

5

they observe

that disclosure figures less prominently in continental Europe than in the
6°
United States and Japan -but they do not provide any general rules of
thumb as to when we should expect one strategy to predominate rather
than another. B ecause they never fu l ly integrate the ten strategies into an
overarching theory, many of the book ' s insights seem to emerge less
from the typ ology itself than from the authors ' efforts to make sense of
61
the welter of different rules and practices of the principal jurisdictions.

5 8 . KRAAKMAN E T AL., supra note 4 , at 4 .
5 9 . ld. a t 24.
60. ld. at 1 1 9-20.
6 1 . For a fascinating recent governance survey that does develop the beginnings of a
theory as to the relationship between different governance approaches, see Katharina Pistor
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Second, the work ' s "functionalism" is further limited by its authors '
decision to emphasize the common underlying structure of all corporate
law, and to exclude all of the other messy factors (such as history,
interest-group pressures , or economic shocks) that have contributed to
the corporate governance we find in any given jurisdiction. I should
hasten to add that this limitation is in many respects more a virtue than a
vice of the analysis. It is this emphasis on underlying similarities that
gives the book much of its power. But it is often difficult to understand
just how corporate governance functions with ou t taking factors ' such as
history and interest groups fully into account, and the book ' s pared-down
functionalism makes it difficult for the authors to assess and explain the
areas in which their five jurisdictions seem to diverge. A s we shall see,
because the authors have excluded history, poli tics, and other factors
from their conception of what "functionalism" entails, their explanations
for jurisdictional

divergences

often

have

an

arbitrary,

ungrounded

quality.
In the discussion that follows, I begin by contrasting the authors '
approach with the most familiar conception of functionalism in the legal
literature-the more full-blooded functional approach pioneered by the
American legal realists during their revolt against legal formalism in the
early

twentieth

century .

I

then

explore

several

recent theories

of

corporate law that come clo ser to the realists' brand of functionalism,
and

offer

more

complete

(though

contested)

explanations

for the

differences among corporate law approaches in different jurisdictions.
Although the constrained functionalism of

Law

The A natomy of Corporate

precludes the authors from providing an alternative to, or critique

of, these recent theories,

The A natomy of Corporate Law

is not irrelevant

to the current debate. I argue in the final Section of this Part that the
authors' ten-strategy schema is best seen as a prequel, rather than a
sequel, to the current debates. The book provides a framework for
understanding the choices available to the relevant decisionmakers in any
given corporate law regime.

et aI., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT 'L
L. 7 9 1 '(2002). Pistor and her colleagues argue that in common law countries,
lawmakers tend to supplement flexible corporate laws (which often lead to strong manager
control and weak shareholder rights) with "a strengthening of exit rights, judicial recourse, and
a new regulatory regime for securities markets." Id. at 838.
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A Less-than-Functional Functionalism ?
When legal scholars announce that "we are all legal realists now,"

they usually mean that everyone now assumes that judicial opinions are
more than simply the scientific application of existing law to each new
set of facts. Rather than turning on purely deductive analysis, judicial
decisionmaking is influenced by a wide variety of social, po litical, and
psychological factors.
In place of the Langdellian vision of law as purely deductive and
scientific , the realists argued for a functional approach to legal analysis
and legislative reform. The traditional approach, the realists argued, led'
to attempts to put everything into rigid frameworks that were as useless
62
and artificial as they were elaborate .
A more functional approach, the
legal realists believed, must look beyond the simple confines of the law ,
and take historical, sociological, and economic factors into account as
63
The law is simply a piece of a much larger system, and only by
wel1.
looking at the entire system can lawmakers and scho lars evaluate any
given issue or develop an informed proposal for change .

The A natomy of Corporate Law

shares something o f this spirit i n its

emphasis on the practical effects of different rules and on the structural
similarities of apparently disparate regimes. But there are clues from the
very

outset that the

authors

have

a much

more

limited brand

of

functionalism in mind than did the legal realists who preceded them. The
book ' s title signals that the authors will confine their attention largely to
the "law" alone, rather than consider historical or political influences or
other factors . Notice, too, the hint of tension between the authors ' claim
that their analysis is functional, on the one hand , and, on the other, their
reliance on a classificatory strategy that looks suspiciously like the
taxonomies that legal realist scholars loved to make fun of.

62. For a useful analysis of the traditional Langdellian approach, see Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PIIT. L. REv. I , I I ( 1 983).
63 . William Douglas used the derisive term "library law" to describe the Langdellian
approach. B ecause it failed to account for "other psychological, political, economic, business,
social factors," Douglas argued, the Langdellian approach "grossly oversimplifies and distorts
the nature of law." William O. Douglas, Education for the Law, Address Before the American
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (Apr. 1936), in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE:
THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURlTfES AND EXCHANGE COMM1SSI0N

1 940) .

2 7 8 , 278, 280 (James Allen ed.,
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This does not mean that the book ' s functionalism is simply a sham.
The authors are careful to look beyond the "law on the books," and to
talk about how corporate governance actually plays out in practice. But
their analysis is almost completely ahistorical and pays very little
attention to the political factors that have influenced corporate
governance law and norms in the five jurisdictions with which they are
most concerned. A more full-blooded functionalism might enab le the
authors to say more about the relationship between a jurisdiction' s
substantive rules and the extent t o which those m·les are actually
enforced. 64 The significance of this omission is particularly apparent at
the ends of chapters 4 through 8, each of which concludes with a short
section that is designed to explain the differences among jurisdictions
with respect to the issues covered in the chapter. The explanatory
sections have an ad hoc quality. Divergences in creditor protection are
characterized as more apparent than real in chapter 4-a phenomenon the
authors atterppt to explain by economic factors such as the cost imposed
by creditor protections. 65 Elsewhere in the book, interest-group influence
66
is used to explain interjurisdictional differences. But there is no context
for assessing the validity of either of these explanations. Why, if each
explanation is correct, does economics reign supreme in one area while
politics calls the tune in another? Is there a way to know which interest
groups are likely to have influence in any given country, and whether
this influence is likely to persist?
The Anatomy of Corporate Law does not provide a basis for
answering these questions. One way to summarize the virtues and
limitations of the book is to distinguish between the "how" and the
"why" of corporate governance. The Anatomy of Corporate Law is
concerned with the "how" questions : How does corporate governance
function? How are various jurisdictions similar and different? The
question that the book does not attempt to answer is why.

64. The authors themselves note this limitation at the outset of the book. KRAAKMAN ET
4, at vi ("While we address issues of taw enforcement, administration, and
compliance throughout, we do not do so with the same consistency or emphasis that we bring
to our comparative discussion of substantive law.").
6 5 . Id. at 98-99.
66 . See, e.g., id. at 214 (speculating that interest-group and economic explanations for
disclosure regulation both have elements of plausibility).
AL., supra note

1 5 44
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B . The Corporate Ownership and Governance Debates
The ahistorical and apolitical quality of The Anatomy of Corporate
Law is especially striking given that these issues-the "why"
questions-are precisely where the action i& in current corporate law and
corporate finance scholarship . In the past decade, developments such as
the shift toward a more shareholder-oriented approach to corporate
governance in Germany and other European countries and Japan' s
continuing economic travails have focused attention on governance
differences among various jurisdictions, prompting a rich debate as to the
reasons for those differences and whether they are likely to persist. Much
of the debate has centered on the contrast between stock -ownership
patterns in the United States and the United Kingdom, where large
corporations are generally widely held, and patterns in Japan and
Western Europe, where concentrated ownership is the norm.
Loosely speaking, one can identify three views, at times overlapp ing,
that have emerged to explain the ownership and governance differences
between jurisdictions. A brief summary and assessment of each will help
to show where The Anatomy of Corporate Law fits, setting the stage for
the adjustments I propose in the next three Parts.
The single most widely debated theory comes from a group of
corporate finance scholars : Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Based on an extensive empirical
survey of corporate governance around the world, La Porta and his
colleagues have published a stream of articles emphasizing differences in
67
the underlying legal regimes. Their approach has come to be known,
appropriately enough, as the "law matters" thesis. In the late 1 990s, they
argued that ownership will remain concentrated unless the country in
question provides legal protections for minority shareholders, such as a
fiduciary duty requirement or voting rules that magnify the voice of
small shareholders. The existence of these protections in the United
States and the United Kingdom-and their absence elsewhere' explain
why shareholdings are dispersed in the United States and the United
Kingdom, but concentrated outside of those jurisdictions. La Porta and
his colleagues have also emphasized the difference b etween common law

67. E.g., Rafael La Porta et ai., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 1. FIN. 47 1
( 1 999); Rafael La Porta et ai., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1 1 1 3 ( 1 998); Rafael La
Porta et ai., Legal Determinants ofExternal Finance, 52 1. FIN. 1 1 3 1 ( 1 997).
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and civil law legal systems. The process o f case-by-case development in
a common law system, they argue, is ideally suited to keeping pace with
changes in commercial life, since judges have the flexibility to adapt
existing precedent to new developments. Civil law systems, by contrast,
are rigid, relying on strict rules with little judicial discretion. On thi s
view, the emergence o f dispersed ownership and market-based
governance in the United States and the United Kingdom may reflect the
superior adaptability of these nations ' judicial systems.
Yet the studies done by La Porta and his colleagues are flawed in
several respects. B ecause their initial corporate governance studies rely
more on the "law on the books" than on how firms are governed in
practice, their assessments can be misleading. 68 In addition, even if they
correctly describe a country ' s governance characteristics, their scoring
system sometimes produces dubious assessments. Their most prominent
study awards a one or a zero for each of six different governance
characteristics, then simply tallies up the total. But the characteristics
vary significantly in their overall importance. Two countries both scoring
four, for instance, may in reality provide very different levels of
shareholder protection. 69
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that the "law matters" thesis
may have gotten the direction of causation backwards. Although La
Porta and his colleagues suggest that legal protection of minority
shareholders makes liquid markets and diffuse ownership possible, in
both the United States and the United Kingdom commercial norms and
private arrangements seem to have paved the way both for diffuse

68. An exchange between Italian corporate law scholar Luca Enriques and one of La
Porta' s coauthors illustrates both this problem and the authors' awar.euess of the limitations of
their study. During that conversation, which took place in 1 996, Enriques pointed out a
number of mistakes in the index created by La Porta and his coauthors. He assumed the
authors would correct the index, but when the article appeared in print, noue of the corrections
had been made. When Enriques later brought this to the attention of one of the authors, he
"replied . . . that so many lawyers had provided them with contrasting comments on what the
law really was in this or that country, that they had soon decided to disregard them." Luca
Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Related Party Transactions: Preliminary Notes for the
Discussion 1 7 n.68 (June 30, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
69. For a similar criticism, see Pistor et aI., supra note 6 1 , at 805. As an example of a
misleading variable, Pistor and her coauthors point out that preemptive rights, which are coded
as a minority shareholder protection, can sometimes benefit large shareholders rather than
dispersed minorities. ld. at 805 n.39.
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ownership and for the laws that La Porta and his coauthors point to as
evidence of shareholder protection. 7o
Like their governance scorecard, La Porta and company ' s recent
work contrasting civil and common law regimes relies on sharp
dichotomies that can obfuscate as well as clarify. Even in civil law
jurisdictions, for instance, judges often exercise an enormous amount of
discretion. 7 1 Despite these flaws-and perhaps in part because of
them72-the work by La Porta and his colleagues has transformed
corporate law and corporate finance scholarship. It is the acknowledged
inspiration for the rapidly expanding recent literature on the determinants
of different corporate governance regimes.
A second perspective, often associated with Mark Roe, focuses
directly on the relationship between politics and a nation' s corporate
governance. 73 In work published several years before the first of the
studies by La Porta and his coauthors, Roe attributed the scattered
ownership of America ' s largest corporations to populist distrust of
concentrated financial power. Each time large financial institutions were
poi sed to take substantial ownership stakes in corporate America, he
argued, politicians intervened, kicking financial institutions out of the
boardroom and ensuring that ownership would remain fragmented. By
contrast, in both Germany and Japan-which lack this populist hostility
to concentrated power-banks and other financial institutions own

70. See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise ofDispersed Ownership: The Roles ofLaw and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, I I I YALE L.1. I, 7 -11 (2001).
7 l . See, e.g., Pistor et aI. , supra note 61, at 799 n . 27 ("[1]n civil law countries courts have
at times played a much more proactive role in shaping the contents of legal rules than the
general principle that 'judges interpret, but do not make the law' may suggest. ").
72. The studies by La Porta and his coauthors have spawned a growing number of articles
calling their treatment of various countries into question.

See, e.g., B rian R. Cheffins, Does
Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 1. LEGAL
STIJD. 459 (2001) (arguing that U.K. history casts doubt on the claim that legal protections are
a prerequisite of dispersed share ownership); Pistor et aI., supra note 61 (providihg a historical
comparison of countries that had originated corporate governance regimes with others that had
imported such regimes); Julian Franks et aI., Ownership: Evolution and Regulation (Aug. 25,
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing a historical study of the
emergence of diffuse ownership and minority shareholder protections in England).
73.

Roe's analysis of the political determinants of American corporate governance is set

supra note 3. The description of Roe'.s work.that follows is drawn in part from the
Corporate
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom,

out in ROE,

more extensive account in John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
55 VAND. L. REv. 1699, 1712-13 (2002).

2004J

Corporate Anatomy Lessons ·

1 547

significant b locks of stock and play a central role in corporate
. 74
enterprIse.
In more recent work, Roe has distinguished between "left-wing"
social democracies, which tend to favor employees ' interests over those
of investors, and "right-wing" countries that are not so strongly worker
oriented. 75 Roe argues that, in a social democracy, managers have an
incentive to pay more attention to employees ' interests than to those of
shareholders. Managers may favor opaque accounting that understates
the company ' s profits, so that the profits can be used to protect the
managers ' and employees ' interests. The employee orientation magnifies
the underlying conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders,
thus increasing the disadvantages of investing in a widely held company .
As a result, the Berle-Means corporation i s less likely to emerge in a
social democracy than it is in a country that does not have a strong
socialist tradition.
Roe ' s political account-like the "law matters" approach and, to a
lesser extent, the Rajan and Zing ales theory discussed below-suffers
from the inevitable limitations of an effort to fit a wide variety of
approaches into a single coherent scheme. "The squirming facts," as the
,
poet Wallace Stevens once put it, "exceed the squamous mind. , 76 Roe' s
political thesis arguably explains corporate governance i n Germany, but
it does not fit England, where the shift toward diffuse ownership came
during a period best characterized as social democratic rule. 77
A third explanation for interjurisdictional divergence comes from
recent work by Raghuram Raj an and Luigi Zingales. 78 Focusing on the

74. My colleague Friedrich Kubler advances a somewhat different account of bank
influence in Germany. The hyperinflation o f the early twentieth century, he argues, decimated
the equity markets, leaving retained earnings and bank loans as the principal sources of
financing for corporations.

See, e.g., Friedrich Kubler, The Impact of Equity Markets on
Business Organization: Some Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the
Evolution of Corporate Structures, 2 EUR Bus. ORG. L REv. 669 (200 1 ).
7 5 . Roe's political explanation of differing ownership regimes worldwide is developed in

MARK J.

ROE, POLITICAL DETERMfNANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); and Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L REv. 5 3 9 (2000).
76. WALLACE STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE
STEVENS 2 1 5 , 2 1 5 (photo. reprint 1 967) ( 1 954).

See, e.g., Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 7 1 6- 1 8 .
G. Raj an & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FfN. ECON. 5 (2003). Raj an and Zingales have
now developed their "great reversal" thesis into a book aimed at a more popular audience. See
77.

7 8 . Raghuram

RAGHURAM G. RAJAN &

LUIGI ZING ALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS :
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emergence of liquid securities markets, which is closely related to the
relative dispersion of share ownership , Raj an and Zingales emphasize the
openness of a country ' s markets to outside investment. In countrie s
where local financial institutions are especially powerful, they have often
sought to stymie foreign investment during a time of crisis in order to
protect their market power over companies' access to capital. If the
efforts of these local interest groups succeed, the country ' s securities
markets may atrophy, creating a "great reversal" as previously liquid
securities markets are stifled. If a country ' s markets are sufficiently open,
on the other hand, or its government is decentralized, the country may
resist the pressure to erect barriers to trade and cross-border financial
flows . England illustrates the latter pattern in recent decades, with the
markets remaining open and equity becoming increasingly dispersed
over the last hal f of the twentieth century. In France, by contrast, markets
were relatively liquid in the early twentieth century, but have become
increasingly dominated by local interests after the shock of the two world
wars. In each case, Raj an and Zingales argue, it is the interaction
between interest groups and external shocks that determines the liquidity
or illiquidity of a nation ' s equity markets.
Although Raj an and Zingales ' s great reversal theory is in many ·
respects the most versatile of the recent explanations, it is not clear how
it fits with interest-group theories that suggest cataclysms have often
undermined rather than enhanced the influence of existing interest
groupS. 79 It also is not clear whether one can derive policy implications
from the theory, other than the general (though important) admonition to
open up one ' s markets as much as one can.
C.

The Anatomy of Corporate Law as Prequel Rather than Sequel

The scholarship that I have just discussed has transformed the
analysis of corporate governance. Given this variety of new theses-that
legal reform has shaped changes in corporate development, that politics
is central, or that the openness of markets has p layed the pivotal role
scholars have taken a closer look at the governance patterns of countries

Ul'.'LEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
OPPORTUNITY

To

CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD

(2003).

79. The theory that catastrophes can undennine previously influential interest groups (and
THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES ( 1 982) .

facilitate growth as a result) is defended at length in MANCUR OLSON,
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throughout the world. More than ever before, the new corporate
governance literature has brought economists, historians, political
scientists, and law professors into a single, very important conversation.
Against this backdrop, the analysis of The Anatomy of Corporate
Law seems to borrow a favorite term of the literary critic Harold B loom,
,,
"belated 80-as if it hailed from an era before scholars had gotten their
hands dirty exploring the complicated twists and turns of corporate
history or had started devising models to explain the dynamics of
governance reform. 8 ! The absence of history, interest groups, and norms
is particularly striking given that the book ' s authors are key players in
82
these debates.
What role can a book like The Anatomy of Corporate Law, which has
so little to say about the recent literature, p lay in the current scholarly
and policy discussion? The best way to answer this question is to look at
The Anatomy of Corporate Law more as a prequel than a sequel to the
current debates . The Anatomy of Corporate Law does not extend or
refine the current literature so much as it provides a framework for
understanding it.
Anyone who has dabbled in the "law matters" literature will
appreciate the importance of developing a common language and
framework. The literature has tended to rely on ad hoc determinations
as to what counts as, say, minority shareholder protections, and
how different jurisdictions ' protections compare with one another.

80.

See, e.g.,

HAROLD BLOOM, WALLACE STEVENS: THE POEMS OF OUR CLIMATE 5 1

( 1 976) (discussing the issue o f "belatedness" in Stevens's poems).
8 1 . In a sense, it did: The project that gave rise to the book started some ten years ago. But
this seems unlikely to be the explanation for the authors' exclusion of history, politics, and
other influences. As we have seen, and as discussed further below, the authors' acontextual
framework is precisely the contribution of the book.
82.

See, e.g.,

CAP[TAL MARKETS AND

COMPAl\'Y

LAW

(Klaus

J.

Hopt &

Eddy

Wymeersch eds., 2003); PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRfNClPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW (7th ed. 2003) (providing the preeminent account of English corporate law

doctrine and history); Hansmann & Kraakman,
converging); Gerard Hertig & Ruben

Securities Regulation, 3 1.

supra note 1 1 (arguing that corporate law is
Lee , Four Predictions About the Future of ED.

CORP. L. STUD. 3 5 9 (2003) (maintaining that recent E.U. efforts to

integrate European securities markets will fail, but that increased harmonization and the
eventual establishment of a pan-European securities regulator are inevitable); Hideki Kanda,

Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured
Investment Funds in Japan, 1 2 U. PA. J. INT ' L BUS. L 569 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (arguing, based in part on
political factors, that Japanese regulation focuses more on ex ante protections than does that of
the United States); Edward B. Rock,

Corporate Governance, 74

WASH. U.

America 's Sh ifting Fascination with Comparative
L.Q. 367 ( 1 996) (exploring the emergence of the

political account of corporate governance).
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The Anatomy of Corporate Law will not make these issues go away. But
the authors ' ten-part typology gives us a framework for making sense of
the s imilarities and divergences of different governance regimes. Indeed,
if we had possessed the authors' typology at the outset of the
comparative tum in corporate governance scholarship, these recent
debates might have had a much less helter-skelter quality.
The Anatomy of Corporate Law is likely to have a particularly
profound influence on the corporate finance literature. As ev idenc ed by
the "law matters" debate, corporate governance scholarship has
witnessed a remarkable confluence of different scholarly disciplines over
the past decade. Even in the 1 990s, legal scholars often ignored parallel
scholarship in the corporate finance literature, and economists paid
relatively little attention to the legal literature. To a remarkable extent,
this has now changed. The days when economists ' models were so
abstract that legal scholars could simply dismiss them are gone, and
economists increasingly look to the legal literature for an explanation of
the relevant legal framework. A great virtue of The Anatomy of
Corporate Law is that it provides a simple set of tools for understanding
all of corporate governance, and thus offers precisely the kind of
tractability that economists look for. Given that it is both simple and
comprehensive , the authors ' ten-part typology will appeal at least as
much to economists as to legal scholars, and will bring the respective
literatures even closer together.
In the Parts that follow, I discuss three adjustments that would make
the book ' s analysis even more powerful and complete. Parts III and IV
argue that bankruptcy and corporate groups should be added to the issues
addressed in the book's substantive chapters. As we shall see, bankruptcy
raises some of the sharpest agency conflicts in all of corporate law, and
adding corporate groups would tie the authors ' agency cost emphasis to
their earlier discussion of the attributes of the corporate form. Part V
briefly considers the unique problems of corporate governance in
developing and transition countries.
III. THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE : BANKRUPTCY
(TowARD A NEW CHAPTER 9)
Although the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law consider a
wide variety of important corporate issues, they explicitly exclude
bankruptcy from their account, lumping it together with other "bodies of
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law [that are] designed to serve objectives that are largely unrelated to
the core characteristics of the corporate form, and therefore do not fall
,
within the scope of corporate law as we define it here. , 83 In some
respects, the authors' decision to omit bankruptcy is understandable. As
their reference to other "bodies of law" suggests, bankruptcy laws are
usually housed in a different statute than the nation' s corporate laws. In
addition, as the authors also point out, "the problems of bankruptcy
presented by corporations are often shared by other types of legal
entities, and the elements of bankruptcy law that address those problems
are not, in many jurisdictions , confined to entities formed as business
.
,,
corporatIOns. 84
The fact that bankruptcy law is not found in the same statutory
provisions as corporate law, however, and that it extends beyond
corporations, is far too slim a reed on which to base a decision to banish
bankruptcy from the analysis. First, in some countries bankruptcy is
included within the overall corporate governance framework; in others
its omission is at least in part a historical accident. The United States is a
particularly good illustration of the latter point. Large-scale corporate
reorganization was developed in the nineteenth century by the same Wall
Street investment banks and lawyers who underwrote a company ' s stock
85
or bonds. If J.P. Morgan underwrote a railroad ' s bonds , and the railroad
later defaulted, Morgan would step in to quarterback the reorganization
process. It was not until well into the twentieth century that bankruptcy
was codified separately from corporate law, and it took a maj or set of
New Deal reforms (which were initially framed as amendments to the
securities laws) to drive a wedge between the corporate and bankruptcy
bars. Until then, corporate reorganization was a seamless part of
corporate governance. 86
Second, if the authors' goal is to provide a functional account of the
underlying structure of corporate law, they obviously should not be
deterred by lawmakers ' decision to put bankruptcy and insolvency rules
in one statute rather than another. Ten or twenty years ago, one could
83. KRAAKMAN ET A L.,
84.

supra note 4, at 1 7 .

Jd.

8 5 . DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HIS TO RY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN

AMERICA 63

(200 1 ) .

See generally id. at 48-70 (recounting the origins of corporate

reorganization in America).
86.

Jd. at 1 1 3-27 (describing the enactment of the Chandler Act o f 1 93 8 , which regulated

corporate reorganization until the bankruptcy laws were completely overhauled in 1 97 8 , and
the Act's effect on the elite Wall Street reorganization bar).
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have argued with a straight face that bankruptcy raises a separate set of
issues. 87 But in an era when developing countries understand bankruptcy
as essential to properly functioning securities markets, and when mergers
and acquisitions have once again become central to U . S . corporate
reorganization, that time has long passed. 88
Think of this Part as a plea to the authors to add an additional chapter
to the next edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law. In the discussion
that follows, I imagine what thi s ninth chapter might look like. I begin by
applying the authors ' typology to the bankruptcy context. I then explore
how corporate law and bankruptcy fit together.
A. Bankruptcy and the Three Agency Cost Problems
Even under U.S . law, with its emphasis on preserving normal
business operations, ordinary regulatory strategies are altered in
important respects when a company files for bankruptcy. In other
countries, the adjustments are even more profound. By focusing on the
three agency problems that The Anatomy of Corporate Law identifies as
the heart of corporate law, we can quickly appreciate how and why this is
so. In this Section, I briefly consider each of the three agency cost
problems and how they play out when a company encounters financial
distress.
1.

The First Agency Problem: Desperate Managers

As a company nears insolvency, the danger that managers will
become unfaithful agents of the firm looms especially large. As in an
impending takeover (which the authors discuss in chapter 7) or in
connection with some maj or corporate transactions (chapter 6), the
managers of a financially troubled company face an end-game situation.
87. When

I first started arguing in my own work that bankruptcy is a facet of corporate
see, e.g., David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter
1 1 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 46 1 ( 1 992), I thought that the idea might even be
original, but I soon discovered that an earlier generation of scholars and bankruptcy lawyers
would have been astonished to learn that anyone viewed them as separate, see, e.g., SKEEL,
supra note 8 5 , at 1 0 9 (describing William Douglas ' s work on both corporate law and corporate
law,

reorganization issues).
88. For discussions of the dramatic recent changes in corporate reorganization in the

United States, see, for example, Douglas G . Baird & Robert K . Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 5 5 STAN. L. REv. 7 5 1 (2002); and David A . Skeel, Jr. , Creditors ' Ball.- The

"New " New Corporate Governance in Chapter 1 1 , 1 5 2 U .

PA. L . REv. 9 1 7 (2003) .
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There is a very good chance that they will lose their jobs unless the
company ' s fortunes quickly tum around. As a result, managers have an
incentive to take drastic actions to reverse the financial distress-actions
that may be inefficiently risky and pose a danger of destroying
significant value.
Dealing with these high managerial agency costs is a central theme
of bankruptcy law in every developed nation. Of the ten governance
strategies , the three that figure most prominently are "removal" rights
(the ex post appointment rights strategy) , and the· two "agent
incentives"-"trusteeship" and "reward." As discussed in more detail in
S ection III.B, most countries adopt either a presumptive or a per se rule
that managers are simply ousted in favor of a court- or creditor-appointed
decisionmaker in the event of bankruptcy . 89 In the United States,
managers continue to run the company even after it files for bankruptcy,
and the locus of removal rights shifts to some extent. But creditors have
increasingly used contractual governance levers to constrain managerial
discretion and to control both the selection and removal of managers. 90
The other standard approach to addressing managerial agency costs
in many bankruptcy regimes is to rely heavily on trusteeship strategies.
This is particularly true when the company' s managers are displaced in
favor of either an administrator or a court-appointed trustee. 9 1 This
trustee is usually required to be disinterested, and she is often instructed
to take all of the corporation's constituencies into account in the
decisions she makes on behalf of the troubled firm. There are two
important qualifications, however, to the general emphasis on
disinterestedness. First, in some countries the choice of decisionmaker

89. In a few countries, such as England, managers also may be subject to liability if they
continue to operate a company that is insolvent, rather than promptly initiate insolvency
proceedings.

See, e.g., Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 7 3 , at 1 746-47 (discussing

"wrongful trading" rules).
90. These developments are discussed in detail in Skeel,

supra note 8 8 .

9 1 . Even in the United States, where this is not the case, disinterested experts play a very
prominent role. For instance, the bankruptcy court is authorized to appoint an examiner to
investigate the debtor's affairs, 1 1 U . S .c.

§ 1 I 04(b) (2000), and in several of the most

prominent recent cases, the reports of examiners or related experts have played a major role in
shaping the reorganization process. In Enron ' s bankruptcy, the examiner's report served as a

roadmap for federal prosecutors and private attorneys who sued the banks that had helped to
facilitate its manipulation of earnings, and WorldCom has adopted nearly all of the corporate
governance reforms that former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden called for in the report he

filed in connection with that case. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, WorldCom Report Recommends
Sweeping Changes/or lIs Board, N . Y . TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at C I ; Ben White & Peter Bchr,
Ciligroup, J.P. Morgan Settle over Enron Deals, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A I .
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(often a receiver) is or can be controlled by one or more of the
corporation ' s creditors . If this is the case, the decisionmaker is likely to
be c losely monitored by creditors, and her decisions will reflect their
interests, even if her compensation is not based on a "reward" strategy.
Second, the reward strategy plays an increasingly important role in
Chapter 1 1 cases in the United States, as managerial compensation is
often based on how quickly the managers reorganize the firm.
In short, because bankruptcy raises serious end-game problems,
managers are kept on a much shorter leash than when the company is
healthy, and in most countries they are displaced in favor of an entirely
new decisionmaker.
2.

Agency Issues Involving Controlling and Minority Shareholders

Like managerial agency costs, the inside or controlling shareholder
problem also figures quite prominently when a company encounters
fmancial distress . The most obvious concern with a troubled company is
that the controlling shareholders will protect themselves at the expense of
minority shareholders and often other parties as well. The most
exaggerated illustration of this problem occurred in Russia in the 1 990s,
when bankruptcy was used by insiders and the financial institutions with
which they were sometimes in cahoots to transfer control to the inside
shareholders. But the problem arises in nearly every bankruptcy regime
in one form or another. Even in companies in the United States and the
United Kingdom that tend not to have controlling shareholders, large
creditors can pose analogous problems if they dominate the process to
the detriment of small creditors and other constituencies. 92
The most common strategies for dealing with maj ority-minority
problems are the two affiliation terms-"entry" and "exit"-together
with "veto," the ex post decision right. One way to limit a maj ority
shareholder's or large creditor ' s manipulation of the process is to provide
extensive access to information about the company ' s financial condition
and prospects, and to protect the terms on which investors exit. In the
United States, Chapter 1 1 adopts this approach by giving parties in
interest the right to examine the debtor and its managers, and by assuring
each investor that she will receive as much in Chapter 1 1 as she would if
92. Indeed, creditors generally assume many of the prerogatives of shareholders in the

insolvency context, and they often become the company 's shareholders if the firm is
reorganized. This shift in control is discussed in detail in Subsection III . A. 3 .
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the company were liquidated. 93 I n countries that cede control to a
creditor or creditors, the extent of disclosure may be much less extensive.
An obvious explanation for thi s difference is that maj or creditors will
already have extensive information about the firm ' s finances, and other
creditors will derive proportionate benefits from the sale or other
disposition of the firm ' s assets by the controlling creditor. Although this
will often be the case, there is a strong argument that extensive
disclosure should be provided even in this context. 94
The other major strategy for reining in large creditors or shareholders
is through the process by which decisions are approved or vetoed.
Chapter 1 1 once again provides the most elaborate protections. All maj or
decisions are subject to court approval, and every affected shareholder or
creditor is entitled to vote on a proposed reorganization plan. 95 The
bankruptcy court also has the power to disqualify votes (such as votes by
a large creditor that seeks to thwart a proposal because it is a competitor
of the debtor) that are not cast in good faith. 96 In other systems, proposals
to sell or reorganize the company are subject to approval by a court, an
administrator, or both. 97
3.

Agency Problems Between the Company and Third Parties :
The Shift in Control

Even in countries that do not focus extensively on the interests of
third parties like creditors and employees while a corporation is healthy,
third parties come to the forefront in the bankruptcy context. By far the
93. See, e.g., 1 1 U.S.c. § 1 1 29(a)(7) (ensuring a minimum recovery for creditors); FED. R .
P. 2004 (providing rights to examination of the debtor). For an argument that
§ 1 1 29(a)(7) functions very much like appraisal rights in corporate law, see Skeel, supra note
87, at 493-94.
94. In Sweden, for instance, which calls for a mandatory auction when a firm files for
bankruptcy, creditors often arrange sales to the company's existing managers. Although this
frequently reflects the fact that the current managers value the business more highly than third
parties, there is also a risk that information asymmetries distort the auction process. For a
discussion of the Swedish framework, see, for example, B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn,
Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy A uctions, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 227
(2003); and Per Stromberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy
Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 1. FIN. 2 64 1 , 2645-48 (2000).
95. See I I U.S.c. § 3 63 (b) (requiring court approval of transactions that are not in the
ordinary course of business); id. § 1 1 2 6 (defining the terms on which voting and class approval
must occur) .
96. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 87, at 5 1 3- 1 5 .
97. See, e.g., Klaus Kamiah, The New German Insolvency Act: Insolvenzordnung, 70 AM.
SANKR. L.J. 4 1 7, 43 1 -32 ( 1 996).
SANKR.
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most important change is a sharp shift in focus from shareholders to
creditors as the principal decisionmakers for the firm. From the
perspective of the ten-part schema of The Anatomy of Corporate Law,
this shift is reflected in the increased use of governance strategies that
give control rights to creditors and constrain the authority of the
company' s shareholders and managers.
The reason for the shift in focus is that the risk that the company
(and, more importantly, its owners) will divert value from its creditors is
unusually high if the firm is in financial trouble. When the firm is
healthy, what is good for shareholders is usually good for all of the
company' s constituencies, since shareholders benefit from good
decisions and are hurt by poor ones. 98 But shareholders ' incentives (like
managers ' , as we have seen) are much more problematic when the
company ' s fortunes go sour. They may encourage the company to take
big gambles, for instance, or discourage the company from pursuing
attractive opportunities if the benefit would go to creditors rather than
shareholders themselves. 99
In creditor-oriented systems, the increase in creditor protection is
especially dramatic. In England, for instance, a lender that holds a
floating charge on the company' s assets is entitled to appoint a receiver
(a "selection right," in terms of the ten-part schema) if the company
defaults . \ 00 Through the receiver, the lender effectively controls the
decision as to how to resolve the financial distress . In Germany, creditors
are entitled to call for a liquidation (an "initiation right") if they are
. unhappy with the course of a company ' s reorganization procedure . t O I

9 8 . This i s because shareholders are the firm' s "residual owners," and thus benefit i f the
company pursues opportunities that have net positive present value, while eschewing those
with negative present value.

For an example of a more nuanced view, emphasizing

shareholders' imperfect incentives even when a company is solvent, see Thomas

A. Smith,
The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty,
98 MICH. L. REv. 2 1 4 ( 1 999).

99. The incentive to take gambles is generally referred to as an "overinvestment" problem,
and the reluctance to pursue beneficial opportunities that benefit only creditors as an
"underinvestment" or debt-overhang problem . The classic treatment is Stewart C Myers,

Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 1. FIN. ECON. 1 4 7 ( 1 977).

1 00 . This right will be eliminated when the recently enacted Enterprise Act, 2 002,

goes into effect. For a discussion, see Armour, Cheffins & Skeel,

c.

40,

supra note 7 3 , at 1 748.

Lenders who hold floating charges will continue to wield si gnificant control, however, because
they control the debtor's access to cash and because the receivers in administration cases are
insolvency professionals, many of whom have close ties to the banks that hold floating
charges.
101.

See, e.g., Kamiah, supra note 97, at 426 .

Corporate Anatomy Lessons

2 004]

1 5 57

In Chapter L 1, which is one of the least creditor-oriented bankruptcy
frameworks, shareholders theoretically retain the right to elect directors
in bankruptcy, but

directorial

elections are seldom held

during

a

bankruptcy case, and shareholders who ask for them are successful only
1
about half of the time. 0 2 Creditors are entitled to ask the court to appoint
1 3
a trustee (a "removal" right), 0 and directors are instructed to focus on
creditors, rather than just shareholders (thus, creditors are added to the
fiduciary "standard" that constrains directorial decisionmaking), once a
1 4
company becomes insolvent. 0 The crowning event of a Chapter 1 1 case
is the vote on a proposed reorganization plan, and here too the shift in
authority is clear. Under the elaborate Chapter 1 1 voting system, each
class of creditors and shareholders is entitled to vote (an approval or
"veto" right over the plan), but, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the
voting rules have the effect of giving particular leverage to the residual
class of creditors-that is, the first class of creditors whose claims cannot
I
be paid in full. 0 5
Nearly all of the creditor protections I have described thus , far are
found

in the

formal

regulatory

contractual mechanisms to

structure.

shift

control

Creditors

also may

use

away

from managers and
1 6
shareholders after the onset of financial distress. 0 The single most

important development in U . S . bankruptcy in the past decade, for
instance, has been the use of ex post contracts to alter the allocation of
control rights in Chapter

Debtor-in-possession (DIP)

11.

financing

agreements have figured particularly prominently in this trend. Thes e
agreements are now used to force sales of assets and to keep the debtor' s

1 02 . For a criticism of the case law, suggesting that even this number of successful

requests is too high, see Skeel, supra note 87, at 506-09.
103.

I I U.s.c. § 1 1 04 (2000). Although this step is rarely taken, creditors can use the

threat of calling for a trustee as leverage over the company's managers.

1 04 . See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors ' Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance . and
the Financially Distressed Corporation, 5 0 UCLA L. REv. 1 1 89 (2003 ) (analyzing fiduciary

duties when a firm nears or enters insolvency).

1 05 . Skeel, supra note 8 7 , at 480-8 1 . I do not mean to suggest that the. American

corporate

reorganization

framework

is

optimal.

To

the

contrary,

the

Chapter

II

decisionmaking rules could be improved in a variety of ways. S hareholders could be precluded

altogether from voting on directors, for instance. But the overall effect of Chapter I I is to shift
decisionmaking authority away from shareholders at a time when their decisionmaking
incentives have become problematic.
1 06. For an excellent new analysis of the role of contracting and renegotiation in the

bankruptcy context, see David C. Smith & Per Stromberg, Maximizing the Value of D istressed
Assets: B ankruptcy Law and the Efficient Reorganization of Firms (O ct. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) .
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managers on a tight leash throughout the bankruptcy proceedings. l 07
Managerial pay is being used in much the same way : Managers are often
promised a larger b onus if the company is reorganized quickly, which
gives them an additional incentive not to dally in Chapter 1 1 . 1 08
I have focused on the enhanced role that creditors play in corporate
governance once bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings have been
initiated. But it is important to emphasize that creditors also figure
prominently in corporate governance well before this time . In the United
States, for instance, DIP financing agreements are invariably negotiated
prior to bankruptcy, and they are often preceded by bank-led efforts to
restructure the company that, if successful, would obviate the need for
bankruptcy. Lenders may insist that the company bring in a new
restructuring officer, for instance, to work with the existing managers. In
each of the authors ' other principal jurisdictions-France, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom-bank lenders figure even more
prominently m corporate governance. Other creditors, such as
bondholders, may also have a governance role.
For several related reasons, The Anatomy of Corporate Law seems to
underemphasize the impo rtance of debt-based governance. First,
although they consider creditor protections such as dividend restrictions
and minimum capital requirements, the authors largely ignore the more
active role that creditors play in corporate governance and the rules that
l09
facilitate this role . Second, the decision to lump creditors together with
other third parties in the third category of agency costs further de
emphasizes the significance of creditors. Finally, leaving bankruptcy and
inso lvency out of the analysis omits the context where, as we have seen,
creditor influence is at its peak.
The next Section develops a more complete analysis of the overall
corporate governance dynamic . First, however, we should briefly
consider the other important third-party issue in bankruptcy : the
treatment of employees. Although employees are not ordinarily given
107 . See Armour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 7 3 , at 1 728; Skeel, supra note 88, at
923-26; David A . Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,

25 CARDOZO L REv. (forthcoming Apr. 2004). Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen have

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Chapter J J at Twilight, 56 STAN. L REV. 673 (200 3 ) ; Baird & Rasmussen, supra

also explored these developments in some detail .
Rasmussen,
note 88.
1 08 . SKEEL,

supra note 85, at 6 1 .

1 09 . The authors thus treat creditors as the passive recipients of various creditor
protections, rather than focusing on their active role in corporate governance.
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appointment rights or decision rights in bankruptcy, they often are
protected by agent constraint strategies that either discourage layoffs or
provide compensation for displaced workers. In Sweden, as in other
European countries, the trustee is required to "take special care in
'promoting employment, ' if this can be done 'without appreciable loss'
1 10
to the claimants of the firm."
In other countries, by contrast,
employees are protected outside of bankruptcy but have less protection in
bankruptcy . In the Netherlands, for instance, some companies use the
bankruptcy to effect layoffs that would be much more difficult to
111
implement outside of bankruptcy.
B . The Dynamic Relationship Between Corporate Governance and
Bankruptcy
The previous Section identified several important patterns in most
countries' treatment of the three core agency problems of corporate law
in the context of bankruptcy. Managerial agency costs are generally
controlled through a decisive "removal" strategy, and many countries
also rely on a heightened "trusteeship" approach. Majority-minority
problems can be reduced by disclosure requirements, and ex post
oversight of major transactions-the "veto" strategy-also figures
prominently. Creditors are protected through a variety of governance
strategies, such as "removal" rights and enhanced influence over
important decisions.
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that these common
patterns suggest that corporate bankruptcy functions in more or less the
same way in every country . To fully understand how bankruptcy (and,
more generally, corporate governance as a whole) works in different
jurisdictions, we need to explore the significance of two central
distinctions: ( 1 ) differences in ownership structure, and (2) differences in
the treatment of managers when a firm files· for bankruptcy . By focusing
on these two factors, we can develop a dynamic perspective on the

1 1 0. Stromberg, supra note 94, at 2646 (quoting Konkurslagen [B ankruptcy Act] ch. 7,
§ 8 ( 1 998) (Swed.), and noting that France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and· Finland have
similar rules).

I l l . See, e.g., Reinout Vriesendorp, Employees and Insolvency in Phase 11: An
Undesirable Consequence of the Dutch 'Polder Model, ' in COMPARATIVE AND

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTfVES ON BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM IN THE NETHERLANDS 27,

3 8 -43 (Reinout Vriesendorp et aL eds., 200 1 ) .
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relationship between corporate law and bankruptcy, a perspective that
dramatically increases the explanatory power of our analysis. I 1 2
The first distinction is connected to the differences in ownership
structure that have been the focus of the recent debates described in
Section II.B. In jurisdictions characterized by concentrated stock
ownership, firms also tend to have concentrated debt; diffuse equity, on
the other hand, seems to be correlated with diffuse debt. The most
obvious explanation for this pattern is agency costs. If the creditors of a
firm with a controlling block o f shareholders were widely scattered, the
shareholders could take advantage of their superior ability to coordinate
by expropriating value from the diffuse creditors. I 13 In this context, bank
loans or other forms of concentrated debt are an important counterweight
to shareholders ' concentration. B ecause bank lending is costly, however�
firms that are widely held (and thus have less need for close creditor
oversight) have an incentive to issue bonds and other forms of diffuse
1 14
debt.
Second, the single most important distinction among different
bankruptcy regimes is whether the corporation ' s managers are displaced
at the outset of the bankruptcy process. As noted earlier, in most
countries the managers are neutralized or replaced, usually by a court- .
115
appointed o fficial.
In the United States, by contrast, managers continue
to run the company . (In England, the informal "London Approach" to
restructuring large companies parallels Chapter 1 1 in intriguing
1 16
respects. )
1 1 2 . As is no doubt apparent, this analysis mo�es us beyond the basic framework of The
Anatomy 0/ Corporate Law and will enable us to develop an overarching theory of corporate
law.

1 1 3 . See Annour, Cheffins & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 7 63-65 . The fact that it is more

difficult for the shareholders to force a large number (as opposed to a small group) of
bondholders to write down their debt, due to the high negotiating costs, is a countervailing

See, e.g., Patrick Bolton &
Optima! Debt Structure and the Number a/ Creditors, 1 04 1. POL. ECON.

consideration in the absence of an effective bankruptcy regime.
David S. Scharfstein,
1 ( 1 996).

1 1 4 . Annour, Cheffins & Skeel,

supra note 73, at 1 76 5 .

1 1 5 . Although Germany modeled i t s extensive recent bankruptcy reforms o n Chapter 1 1 ,
for instance, those reforms retain a presumption that managers will be removed at the outset of
the bankruptcy case.

See, e.g., KamIah, supra note 97, at 426 (explaining that managers are

typically replaced by administrators).
1 1 6. In a London Approach restructuring, the banks that have participated in syndicated
lending to a large corporate debtor agree to an informal standstill, then conduct an
investigation of the troubled company. If they conclude that the business is viable, the banks
negotiate a restructuring plan entirely outside of the formal insolvency rules. The early London
Approach restructurings were spearheaded by the central bank, which prodded smaller lenders
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Notice the pattern here : In j urisdictions with concentrated ownership,
we tend to see concentrated debt and a manager-displacing bankruptcy
regime. Diffuse equity, by contrast, is usually correlated with diffuse
debt and a manager-driven bankruptcy process . Once again, agency costs
seem to be an important part of the explanation. In a concentrated
ownership regime, harsh, manager-displacing bankruptcy rules reinforce
the leverage of the monitoring bank, since managers know that the
guillotine awaits them if they resist bank intervention in the event of
financial distress. 1 1 7 With widely held firms, by contrast, similarly harsh
bankruptcy rules would create disequilibrium in the governance
framework. Faced with the prospect of removal in bankruptcy, managers
would have a strong incentive to protect themselves from the equally
harsh discipline of the takeover market either by encouraging friendly
investors to buy a concentrated block of shares, or by persuading
1 18
lawmakers to shut down the takeover market.
Focusing on the dynamic relationship between corporate governance
and bankruptcy clarifies the underlying anatomy of corporate law in
several important ways. F irst, the analysis I have sketched out-which I .
,,
have referred to elsewhere as an "evolutionary theory 1 19-enables us to
make sense of the complex interrelationship of regulation , formal
contract, and informal norms. By incorporating the ten-part typology into
a more general theory, we can avoid the ad hoc quality that The A natomy
of Corporate Law has when it attempts to make sense of the differences
among the governance rules of different jurisdictions.
Second, the analysis can also be used to make predictions about the
likely effect of changes in regulation or in the relative strength of interest
groups. Take, as an example , the Raj an and Zing ales insights into the
interest-group influence of local financial institutions. 1 20 The
evolutionary account suggests that powerful financial institutions should
to effect informal reorganizations. For a detailed discussion, see John Armour & Simon
Deakin,

Norms in Private Insolvency: The "London Approach " to the Resolution of Financial
Distress, I J. CORP. L. STUD. 2 1 (200 1 ).
1 1 7 . See David A Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 5 1 VAND. L. REv. 1 32 5 , 1 3 44-45 ( 1 998).
1 1 8. Armour, Cheffms & Skeel, supra note 73, at 1 726-27; Skeel, supra note 1 1 7, at
1 34 1 . In the United States, there are now more barriers to hostile takeovers than in the past,
and, as we have seen, bankruptcy is characterized by greater creditor control.

1 1 9 . See Skeel, supra note 1 1 7 (arguing that market-based corporate governance is likely
to be accompanied by manager-driven bankruptcy, and bank or insider governance by
manager-displacing bankruptcy).

1 20 . See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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b e expected to translate their influence into a harsh, manager-displacing
bankruptcy framework through lobbying or other means. If a jurisdiction
with market-based governance were to adopt manager-displacing
b ankruptcy rules, by contrast, we would expect to see either successful
efforts by managers to subvert the manager-displacing rules (thus
altering the "selection" and "removal" appointment rights) or an increase
in the concentration of firms ' stock and debt. This would equilibrate the
system of corporate governance in a manner consistent with the
predictions of Raj an and Zingales, but through a mechanism that lies
beyond the explanatory power of their theory.
Finally, although the theory is principally descriptive in nature, it
also has important normative implications. The most important of these
implications involve efforts to change existing governance regimes, such
as the market reforms in Russia and Eastern Europe. As we shall see in
Part V, for instance, the evolutionary theory suggests that the equity
markets were the wrong place to start with market reform in such
countries.
IV. OF CORPORATE GROUPS AND CORPORATE BOUNDARlES
(TOWARD A NEW CHAPTER 1 0)
The large corporations that The Anatomy of Corporate Law is
particularly concerned about explaining are not monolithic. Most, from
Daimler-Chrysler to Mitsubishi, are extensive networks of corporate (and
often noncorporate) entities. Enron, to give a somewhat exaggerated
recent example, included roughly two thousand different entities. 1 2 !
Despite the common name, these entities often consist of a collection of
separate enterprises that are linked together-under a single parent
corporation, through cross-shareholdings, or in other ways.
The ancient philosophers had a vivid expression for the notion that
groups sometimes seem to have a single identity on the one hand, but
also to consist of a large number of autonomous people or parts on the
other. They called it the problem of the "one and the many .'? Suppose a
flock of b irds is (or are) flying in tandem. Is the flock a single entity, the
philosophers asked, or should we focus instead on the individual birds?

1 2 1 . See, e.g., Joseph N. DiStefano, In Delaware, Enron Found Secrecy and Savings,
3 1 , 2002, at Al ("Enron Corp. organized a spraw ling network of 2,000
corporate subsidiaries in 62 countries and 23 U.S. states.").

PHILA. INQUlRER, Jan.
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Or, as the philosophically inclined poet Wallace Stevens framed the
issue: "Twenty men crossing a bridge, I Into a village, I Are twenty men
crossing twenty bridges I Into twenty villages, I Or one man I Crossing a
, 122
single bridge into a village. , ("This is an old song , " Stevens went on to
,, 1 23
say, "That will not declare itself . . . . )
If we look at the corporate laws of the five countries that feature
most prominently in The Anatomy of Corporate Law, there is a striking
divergence of perspectives on the question of whether organizationally
linked corporations should be treated as isolated entities or as a single
group . In Germany, lawmakers view corporate groups as a single entity,
and subj ect corporate groups (referred to in German as Konzernrecht) to
24
an elaborate set of rules. 1 The United States, by contrast-with an
obliviousness to the nature of groups that would make the philosophers
wince-gives much more weight to the formal corporate boundaries and
often ignores the overall corporate group ; Japan, France, and the United
25
Kingdom fall somewhere in between. 1
At various points in their study, the authors of The Anatomy of
Corporate Law note the role of corporate groups in the countries with
which the book is concerned. Chapter 4, for instance, which focuses on
creditor protections, provides an elegant description of the concerns
raised by corporate groups, such as the risks that "such a structure might
reduce transparency by blurring divisions between the assets of group
members," and that the "group structure allows controllers to set the
terms of intra-group transactions, and thus to assign (and reassign) value
within the group" in ways that could "extract value from the creditors or
1 26
minority shareholders of a group member.,, Aside from these scattered
references , however, the authors have very little to say about the
·
1 27
slgm· filcance 0 f corporate groups .

1 22.

WALLACE STEVENS,

WALLACE STEVENS,

supra

Metaphors of a Magn.ifico, i n
1 9 , 1 9.

THE COLLECTED POEMS OF

note 76, at

1 23. Id
1 24. For a discussion of the German approach, see, for example, Herbert Wiedemann, The
German Experience with the Law of Affiliated Enterprises, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES fN
EUROPEAN LAWS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON MULTfNATIONAL ENTERPRISES 2 1
( Klaus J Hopt ed. , 1 982).
1 25 . See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 76 (describing the differences among

jurisdictions' perspectives).

1 26. Id at 75.
1 27. As noted

above, the authors' most extensive treatment of corporate groups comes in

chapter 4, where they discuss creditor protections. In addition, in chapter

5,

they note that

German law includes strict formal requirements that a subsidiary be indemnified if the
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I argue in this Part that by giving short shrift to the role of corporate
groups , the authors have missed an opportunity to integrate their initial
analysis of the attributes of the corporation-and, in particular, the
corporation's asset-partitioning function-with their ten-part typology of
strategies for addressing agency problems . B y adding a final chapter on
the dynamics of corporate groups , the authors could have shown how the
choice of corporate boundaries is itself strongly influenced by (and in
tum intluences) subsequent agency issues. Such a chapter would extend
the analysis and at the same time bring it back to the beginning-back to
the choice of entity fonn.
The Part begins by speculating as to why The Anatomy of Corporate
Law has so little to say about corporate groups. I then show how the
choice of corporate boundaries could be incorporated into, and would
enrich, the overall analysis. My goal , of course, is to propose another
new chapter for the book. After the authors added a new chapter 9 to deal
with bankruptcy , the book I imagine would include one last maj or
chapter: "Chapter 1 0 : Of Corporate Boundaries and Corporate Groups."
* * *

Although the authors do not explain in detail why they have given
such short shrift to corporate groups, they seem to have decided that the
issues raised by corporate groups are not different in kind from the issues
raised by a single corporate entity. There is an initial plausibility to th is
view (at least to an Anglo-American corporate law scholar-I suspect
most Gennan scholars would beg to differ), and I begin by showing why
this is so.
The argument is this : The key issue both for a single corporate entity
and within a corporate group is agency costs. Take self-dealing. A
particular problem in a parent-subsidiary framework is the risk that the
parent corporation (or a block of shareholders that controls the parent)
will use its control to favor the parent and its shareholders at the expense
1 28
The parent might enter into contracts with ' the
of the minority.

subsidiary incurs losses from a group decision that benefits the group overall at the expense o f
the subsidiary, but that these rules are widely ignored in practice.

Id. a t 1 24-26. They also

point out that the French approach, which relies less on formal rules, "is favored to become the
model for European harmonization." !d. at

1 26.
1 28. See id. at 1 24-26 (describing this concern as motivating the German and French

rules).
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subsidiary that are wildly unfair to the subsidiary, for instance. Although
this may be an especially pressing concern for corporate groups, it is
c losely analogous to the concerns raised by contracts between a single
corporate entity and one of its managers or controlling shareholders.
Indeed, in the United States, Delaware courts apply essentially the same
. .
1 29
ana1YSIS ill b oth contexts.
Whether courts truly treat issues involving corporate groups the same
way as those that involve a single corporate entity is a matter of much
discussion, even in the United States. Commentators have long assumed
that courts are more willing to "pierce the veil" within a corporate group,
1 30
But this by itself would not call into question the authors'
for instance.
decision to forgo separate treatment for corporate groups. Even if the
outcomes differ somewhat, the fact that veil piercing is analyzed
similarly in corporate groups and in other contexts would justify a
decision not to treat corporate groups separately with respect to this kind
of issue.
If we shift our focus, however, and look at how and why corporate
groups are set up in the first place, rather than transactions entered into
thereafter, the case for downplaying corporate groups looks much more
problematic. Corporate groups don 't simply spring forth fully formed,
like the goddess Athena from her father Zeus ' s head. To the contrary,
they are the product of numerous decisions. Firms must decide whether
to include an entire business within a single corporation or to separate it
into two or more distinct corporations, for instance; or whether to cement
ties with another corporate group through cross-shareholdings. Each of
these decisions is influenced in crucial respects both by agency costs
the focus of the authors ' ten-part typology-and by the attributes of the
corporate form.
To appreciate how these factors help to explain corporate groups,
recall that, as a historical matter, the most important benefit of the
1 29 .

See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A . 2d 422 (DeL 1 997) (applying the entire

fairness standard in a transaction involving a controlling shareholder); Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys . , Inc . , 638 A.2d 1 1 1 0 (DeL 1 994) (relying on a similar standard in a case
involving a squeeze-out acquisition by a corporate parent).
1 3 0. When courts "pierce the veil," they hold the shareholders, parent corporation, or

related subsidiaries liable for the obligations of the corporation in question, thus refusing to

honor the corporate attribute o f limited liability. For an empirical study of the outcomes in
veil-piercing cases suggesting that parent corporations are frequently held responsible for
obligations of their subsidiaries, though not quite
B. Thompson,

( 1 991).

as

commonly as is often thought, see Robert

Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036
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corporate form was asset partitioning. 1 3 I As Hansmann and Kraakman
have argued in several pieces showcasing this attribute, the corporate
form facilitates creditor monitoring and thus reduces a firm ' s cost of
credit by assuring corporate creditors that they will have priority over
1 32
creditors of any of the corporation' s shareholders.
Monitoring
efficiencies thus provide one explanation for the decision to. house
different parts of an enterprise in separate corporations. If (to use their
illustration) the company includes both an oil business and a chain of
hotels, for instance, the benefits of speciaIized monitoring by different
creditors might be one reason to set up separate oil and hotel
corporations, rather than treating them as divisions within a single
business.
Monitoring efficiency is unlikely to be a complete explanation for
the decision to incorporate the oil and hotel businesses separately,
however. As Hansmann and Kraakrnan note, the parties could achieve
similar monitoring benefits in other ways, such as secured finance. If one
creditor lent on a secured basis to the oil business, and another to the
hotels, each could serve as a specialized lender to the part of the business
against which it held a priority claim. 1 33
In a recent article, George Triantis argues that the tradeoff between
managerial flexibility and agency costs is another important factor in
deciding how to structure a corporate group . 1 34 If the oil and hotel
businesses are structured as divisions within a s ingle corporate entity,
managers can more easily shift capital from one business to the other as
circumstances change. Because managers have better information than
anyone else about the prospects of each business , this flexibility-which
finance theorists refer to as a "switching option[]"--can prove very
valuable. 135 But greater flexibility means greater agency costs, since
managers may use the discretion to further their own interests rather than
the best interests of the enterprise. They may prop up a hopeless
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
Squire, supra note 20, at I .
131.

1 32.

20, at 3 9 3 ; Hansmann, Kraakman &

1 3 3 . Although Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge the role of secured credit, they
argue that it is at most a partial substitute for asset partitioning.

Kraakman & Squire,

supra

See, e.g.,

Hansmann,

note 20, at 4 (questioning the usefulness of secured credit where

there is a '''floating' group of creditors").
1 3 4. George G . Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal
Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts i" Commercial and Charitable Enterprises,
1 1 7 HARV. L. REv. 1 1 02 (2004).
1 3 5 . Id. at 1 1 0 3 .
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business, for instance, in order to protect their perks or their j ob s .

! 36

Separate incorporation reduces this problem, since separate corporations
are subj ect to higher disclosure obligations, and their transactions are
subj ect to greater scrutiny, than is the case for divisi ons of a single
! 37
corporation.
Where flexibility is particularly important, we would
expect businesses to be housed in a single corporation� by contrast,
separate corporations make more sense if the switching option is less
valuable or managerial agency costs particularly high.
Seriously complicating the boundary decision-or at the least, our
efforts to explain the corporate groups we see in practice-is the fact that
the boundaries are often indirectly influenced by various kinds

of

noncorporate regulation. The most obvious illustration is tax. When
Enron set up thousands of separate entities for its structured finance
transactions,

or

when

corporations

establish

sep arate

offshore

corporations to hold title to their intellectual property, the boundary
decision was or is driven more by tax considerations than by corporate
!38
govemance.
A particularly important tax concern for multinational
companies is the treatment of transfer pricing. An obvious imp lication
for understanding corporate groups is that, to the extent these regulations
encourage distortions in the corporate structure, the distortions should be
viewed as an important cost of such regulations.
Corporate law itself can, of course, distort these boundary decisions
as well. If the German

Konzernrecht

indemnification requirements were

strictly enforced, the obligation to compensate subsidiaries for any
decision that redistributed value elsewhere in the group could have a
chilling effect on the incorporation of separate subsidiaries. In practice,
as the

authors of

The Anatomy of Corporate Law

point out,

the

indemnification requirements seem to be largely ignored so long as the
SU b SI' d tary
'
IS
.

so Ivent. 1 39

In the United States, the recent WorldCom bankruptcy sparked a
controversy

over

whether

bankruptcy

courts

should

"substantively

1 36. Id. at 1 1 05.
1 37. fd. at 1 1 25-27 (describing the higher fiduciary duty and disclosure obligations where
separate subsidiaries are set up).
1 3 8. Delaware does not impose a state tax on many kinds of passive income (such as
income from intellectual property rights). This benefit seems to have been a major
consideration in Enron's decision on where to set up separate business entities. See, e.g.,
DiStefano, supra note 1 2 1 (characterizing the tax-free status of passive income as a generally
important attraction of Delaware as a state of incorporation) .
1 3 9. KRA.AKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 25.
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consolidate" the obligations of a corporate group whose members file for
bankruptcy-that is, ignore the group ' s corporate boundaries and lump
the creditors of different entities together. In the past, courts have refused
to consolidate the obligations of a corporate group unless the boundaries
had been essentially ignored outside of bankruptcy. In WorldCom,
however, the debtor argued for consolidation on administrative grounds,
140 If WorldCom
as a way of simplifying the restructuring process.
foreshadows a loosening of the restrictions on substantive consolidation,
this shift would have the opposite effect from strict enforcement of the
German indemnification rules: Whereas the German rules would enforce
the boundaries between firms too strictly, substantive consolidation
would make them too porous. In each case, the benefits of the boundaries
would be undermined.
The corporation and its shareholders are not the only ones that are
affected by the company' s boundary decisions . Corporate boundaries
also have important i mplications for the agency relation between the firm
and third parties. In many jurisdictions, the most important corporations
are government-owned or government-controlled. A particularly vexing
boundary issue in thi s context is whether and when to permit
corporations to expand into new businesses. Because government-owned
corporations often have market power in their core business, there is a
danger that the firm will use an existing monopoly to subsidize its
expansion into the new business, to the detriment of actual and potential
creditors. One way to minimize the risk of inappropriate cross
subsidization would be to require the corporation to set up a separate
subsidiary if it wished to enter into a new line of business. 141 As with the
analogous restrictions on u . s . financial services corporations, 142 this
140. The decision to substantively consolidate the entities for the purposes of
WoridCom's proposed reorganization plan was challenged by a group of creditors but later
settled. Many observers (including this one) suspect that the bankruptcy court would have
rejected the challenge and upheld the consolidation.
1 4 1 . For a more detailed defense of this proposal, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Virtual
Privatization: Governance Reforms for Government-Owned Firms, 2 J. CORP. L. STIID . 82,
1 02-06 (2002).
142. Until the recent repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.c. §§ 24, 78, 3 77-378
( 1 994) (repealed 1 999), banks were prohibited from engaging in both investment and
commercial banking, and banks and insurance companies could not be housed in the same
corporate group . These barriers have since been removed, but such businesses must still be set
up as distinct subsidiaries under a single corporation . See. e.g., Adam Nguyen & Matt
Watkins, Recent Legislation, Financial Services Reform, 37 HARV. 1. ON LEGIS. 5 7 9 (2000)
(describing the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the new requirements to replace its
regulations).
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structural separation would make it much easier for regulators or other
observers to track the transfers of funds from one business to the other,
and thus would reduce the risk that the corporation would use profits
from a monopoly business to subsidize expansion into other, more
competitive areas.
The benefits of a mandatory subsidiary requirement for government
owned corporations vividly illustrate a more general point about the
relationship between regulatory oversight and a firm's decision regarding
how to structure the corporate group . The finn (and -its investors) is
concerned about the tradeoff between flexibility and managerial agency
costs. The optimal choice for the firm ' s shareholders is not always the
socially optimal choice, however. This potential conflict suggests that a
third crucial factor influencing boundary decisions is the role of
regulatory intervention in minimizing the risk that such decisions will
impose costs on third parties that are not internalized by the corporate
group engaging in corporate restructuring.
By adding corporate groups to the overall analysis of corporate law,
as I have attempted to do here , we can develop a more complete theory
one that integrates the attributes of the corporation with the agency cost
concerns that animate the authors' ten-part typology . This more complete
theory also has the virtue of accounting for the way large corporations
are actually structured in most jurisdictions. Corporations are not simply .
one; they are also many.
v.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION
COUNTRIES (TOWARD AN EXPANDED EPILOGUE )

. The Anatomy of Corporate Law is framed largely as an analysis of
corporate governance in developed economies. "[W]e focus," Kraakman
announces on the first page of the preface, "on what we understand to be
corporate laws of five major commercial jurisdictions: France, Germany,
, 143
But their analysis is not limited to this
Japan, the UK and the U . S . ,
context: "[A] signal achievement of thi s book is," as Kraakman puts it,
"the development of an analytical framework that transcends particular
, 144
jurisdictions . , Underscoring the universality of intended application is
the authors' choice of touchstone jurisdictions. Few countries develop
1 43 . KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at v.
1 44. ld.
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their own corporate law from scratch. Major enactments are usually
borrowed from the laws of another country , and it turns out that nearly
every corporate law in the world can be traced, directly or indirectly, to
one or more of the five jurisdictions on which the authors focus . 1 45
The implicit universality of the framework-it is, after all, the
anatomy of corporate law-raises an obvious question: Is it safe to
assume that the typology will help us to understand how corporate law
functions in every country, everywhere in the world? To answer this
question , conduct a simple thought experiment. Suppose you are a
corporate law professor, and you have been asked to visit a developing or
transition country. You will be expected to talk to the relevant officials,
market players, and community groups in order to prepare a report
offering suggestions for reform. (This thought experiment is hardly
far-fetched; many are the corporate law scholars who have packed their
parkas or sunblock and headed to the airport to consult on corporate or
market reform in the past decade or so.) If you brought only your copy of
The Anatomy of Corporate Law-already available in paperback, one
hopes, by the time you left-and spent the visit asking your interviewees
which regulatory and governance strategies the country had adopted,
would this tell you everything you needed to know? Would the
interviews give you a complete picture of how governance functioned in
the developing country?
The answer, of course, is no. If we have learned anything from the
corporate governance reform projects of recent years, it is that the
strategies that are used in developed countries cannot simply be
transp lanted into a developing country with the expectation that they will
function in a comparable way. In terms of practical importance, there is
no greater corporate governance issue in the world today than the
question of how to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in
deve loping countries.
In the epilogue, the authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law
characterize the book as "provid[ing] a platform for a wide-ranging
program of multi-disciplinary research on corporate law," and suggest a
series of "avenue[s]" for future research that scholars could pursue. 1 46
Although some of the proposed projects can be seen as relevant for

1 45. See, e.g.,

Pistor et aI., supra note

6 1 , at 799 (describing England, the United States,

Germany, and France as "spearhead[ing] the development of corporate law").
1 46. KRAAKMAN ET AL . , supra note

4,

at 222.
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developing economies , the authors clearly have the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan most directly in mind.
The discussion that follows suggests one final adjustment to the
authors' handiwork. Call it the last and most important avenue for future
research: How can we apply the lessons of this book and other recent
corporate governance work to the distinctive problems of developing
countries? 147 In the first Section, I briefly describe a few of the
unexpected consequences of recent governance reforms and summarize
the lessons that can be learned from them. The Section that fonows
sketches out several proposals for how we should think about reform.
A. The Law of Unintended Consequences: A Brief, Selective Tour
Over the past decade or so, starting with the collapse of the Soviet
empire in 1 9 89, corporate governance reform has been on the agenda
across the globe. More often than not, reforms have had very different
effects than their proponents expected. Let me start with two short
examples, chosen almost at random.
The most dramatic wake-up call, at least for academic reformers,
came in Russia. Starting in the early 1 990s, a group of academic experts,
many of them based at Harvard, were hired to consult on corporate
governance and market reforms. In connection with the project, two of
the leading American corporate law scholars (including one of the
authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law) proposed an elegant
framework for Russian corporate law. 148 To protect minority
shareholders against oppression, they called for a combination of per se
rules and enhanced voting requirements. When Russia enacted a new
corporate law, its lawmakers drew extensively on the framework that the
academics had proposed. Despite the elegance of the proposal, however,
it proved to be a complete disaster in practice-not because there was
anything wrong with the new provisions, but because the formal
framework was almost completely ignored. Corporate insiders ravaged

1 47 . In the initial draft of The Anatomy of Corporate Law, the authors proposed ten
avenues for further research. As noted earlier, they added an eleventh-"emerging
jurisdictions" issues-in response to this Review. See id. at 226.
1 48 . Bernard B lack & Reinier Kraakrnan, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
1 09 HARV. L. REv. 1 9 1 1 ( 1 996).
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Russia's newly privatized corporations, undeterred by the corporate
governance framework. 149
Second example: Hungarian reformers dramatically revised their
bankruptcy laws in the mid - I 990s, drawing extensively on the U . S .
bankruptcy laws. They framed the new regime as a Chapter 1 I -style
corporate reorganization code and included a provision that authorized
debtor-in-possession financing, just as in the United States. In practice,
however, Hungarian firms are almost never able to obtain financing
apparently in large part because lawmakers omitted the special priority
U . S . lenders are given-and the reorganization provisions are rarely used
to reorganize troubled firms. l so One could multiply these examples
almost endlessly. India created special bankruptcy tribunals, but the
SI
Efforts to privatize
experiment was arguably a complete failure. l
corporations in Eastern Europe have had dramatically different
consequences than reformers expected. I S2
* * *

What are some of the lessons we can learn from these expenences
over the past decade, from the unintended consequences of reform? The
first lesson is that even the most carefully crafted corporate governance
framework is useless if the underlying infrastructure isn't in place. In
many developing and transition countries , the judicial system is not
effective enough to protect basic property rights. In this context, any
corporate governance reform effort needs to take account of the
limitations of the underlying enforcement system.
149. For a postmortem speculation about what went wrong, with a particular emphasis on
the absence of adequate judicial enforcement, see Bernard Black et aI., Russian Privatization
and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1 73 1 (2000). For an
empirical analysis of analogous problems with the Russian bankruptcy framework (with a
focus on expropriation by alliances of managers and regional governments), see Ariane
Lambert-Mogiliansky et aI., Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence (June 1 8 ,
2003) (unpublished manuscript, o n file with author).
ISO. See, e.g., Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Remarks at the Bankruptcy-Corporate Governance
Panel Meeting, Institute for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University (Sept. 24, 2003) (arguing
that the failure to give priority to debtor-in-possession finance has been a "key to the failure of
[Hungary 's reorganization] procedure in practice").
1 5 1 . For one analyst ' s opinion, see E-mail from Leora Klapper, Senior Financial
Economist, World Bank (Feb. 1 1 , 2004) (on file with author) (describing problems with the
specialized courts in India, and with reforms in Sri Lanka, Romania, and other countries).
1 52. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L . REv. 7 8 1 , 782 (200 1 ) .
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Even if judicial enforcement is adequate, governance reforms are
unlikely to have a significant effect unless there is a demand for them.
,153
"We find two distinct patterns of legal change in transplant countries,,
Katharina P istor and her colleagues explain in a recent study of corporate
evolution in ten countries, some of which served as the source and others
as the recipient of corporate law frameworks. "One is lethargy. The other
, , 1 54
In the transplant j urisdictions
is quite the opposite-erratic change.
they studied, the "countries that receiver d] foreign law [were] frequently
,,
unprepared �or the changes it [broughtJ. 1 55 As a result, the new laws
were either ignored or repeatedly altered, with little apparent effect on
1 6
actual corporate governance. 5
Even if there is an adequate infrastructure, and even if there is a
demand for a new law, reforms often have a very different effect in the
new country than in the jurisdiction from which they are borrowed or
adapted. As i llustrated by the Hungarian experience noted above, a small
change in a provision borrowed from elsewhere can lead to dramatically
different results in the adopting country.
B . Learn ingfrom the Recent Mistakes
By itself, The Anatomy of Corporate Law would be a most
misleading guidebook for understanding corporate governance in a
developing or transition country . Because the authors ' typology is based
largely on the law on the books , it is not designed to make sense of the
vicissitudes of corporate law in many countries-such as the divergence
between rules and practice, and the comparative irrelevance of formal
rules in the absence of adequate j udicial enforcement. 1 5 7 But if we put the
1 53.
1 54.
155.
1 5 6.
Finance

Pistor et a!.,

supra note 6 1 , at 840.

Id.
Id. at 841.

Id. (describing the experience in Colombia); see also Katharina Pistor et aI . , Law and
in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, 3 2 8 (2000) ("Past experience
with legal reforms suggests that where new laws were forced upon a judicial system unfamiliar

with the underlying legal tradition and were not adapted to fit the specific local context, the
effectiveness of the law suffered.").

1 5 7 . Not surprisingly, existing data suggest that an increase in the enforcement of contract
See, e.g., Daniefa Fabbri &
Mario Padula, Legal Institutions, Credit Market and Poverty in Italy (Apr. 1, 2003)

rights can have a dramatic effect on borrowers ' access to credit.

(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding much greater access to credit in Italian
regions where courts function more efficiently, as measured by backlogs of cases). Judicial
enforcement is also linked to higher rates of bankruptcy filings. See Stijn Claessens et a!.,
Resolution o/ Corporate Distress in East Asia, 1 0 J. EUR. FIN. 1 99 , 200 (2003).
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book in the broader context of the insights I have developed in this
Review, it offers a "platform"-to use the authors ' word-both for
understanding corporate governance in developing countries and for
rethinking the focus of future reforms . Although the regulations and
governance reforms supported by law in developed jurisdictions like the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France , and Japan are not
available by way of the judiciary in many developing and transition
nations , The Anatomy of Corporate Law still gives us a framework for
understanding and creating strategies aimed at minimizing the agency
issues inherent in the corporate form-particularly if we supplement the
framework with the more robust functional analysis discussed in Part H.
One obvious implication of the absence of effective judicial
enforcement i s that policymakers should place less emphasis on devising
elaborate corporate codes for developing and transition jurisdictions.
Harnessing private solutions-governance strategies that minimize the
need for court oversight-may be much more promising in this regard.
Interestingly, contemporary practices in two of the most developed of all
nations-the United Kingdom and the United States-could offer a
useful analogy. In England, under the so-called "London Approach," the
central bank has long put informal pressure on bank lenders to
restructure troubled corporate debtors outside of the formal insolvency
158
framework.
In an emerging country that has a stable central bank but
spotty judicial enforcement, a process resembling the London Approach
could prove much more effective than full-blown insolvency rules.
Somewhat similarly, in the United States, corporate debtors that wish to
minimize their stay in bankruptcy can negotiate the terms of a
restructuring outside of bankruptcy and ask the court to confirm a
"prepackaged" reorganization plan. Like the London Approach, this
strategy-which harkens back to the nineteenth-century railroad
receiverships-sharply reduces the need for judicial involvement. 1 59
Of course , it i s important to recognize that private negotiations carry
their own potential risks. There is a danger that the parties represented at
the bargaining table will favor themselves in the restructuring at the
expense of other interested parties. This suggests both that the
effectiveness of private negotiations will depend in important part on the
1 5 8 . For a description of the London Approach, see supra note 1 1 6.
1 5 9. For a simi lar point, see Erik BerglOf et al., The Formation of Legal Institutions for
Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Legislative History 37 (Feb . 1 9 , 200 1 ) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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reputational stake that the principal players have i n the quality o f the
restructuring, and that at least limited judicial oversight is necessary to
protect third parties.
A second, and quite related, implication is in the context of market
reform. During the wave of privatizations in Eastern Europe and Russia
in the 1 990s, reformers assumed that the way to develop liquid capital
60
markets was to focus on stock. 1 Yet much of the analysis of this
Review suggests that debt financing-either bonds or bank lending
may be a more sensible starting point than the stock market. In most
countries, as in nineteenth-century America, there is likely to be an
existing interest group that already has a stake in the credit markets and
161 Reformers could
could serve as an underwriter for corporate bonds.
look to the underwriters, or to existing professionals in the accounting
industry or the bar, to act as bond trustees to represent the interests of
scattered investors. These professionals would have a reputational stake
in creating a properly functioning market, since their future business
would depend on investors ' willingness to continue buying bonds. In
addition, investors might be less skittish about investing in bonds than in
stocks, both because debt has a higher priority claim against the
company ' s assets and because bond ownership is a less dramatic step for
1 62
individuals who have not previously participated in the market.
In some emerging markets, bank lending may be a superior source of
corporate financing to that of publicly traded bonds or stocks. In part, the
choice may turn on the nature of a country's principal industries. "For
the less risky, capital intensive modernization investments characteristic
of lower levels of economic development," as the authors of one recent
study note, "bank finance may be more appropriate [than equity
1 60. For an extensive and important analysis of the preconditions for developing effective
securities markets, see generally B lack,

supra note 1 52.

1 6 1 . The most obvious candidate, as in nineteenth-century America, is existing or newly
emerging banks. See, e.g., SKEEL,

supra note 85, at 63 -69 (describing the role of Wall Street

investment banks and the Wall Street bar in the bond market and corporate reorganizations).
1 6 2 . For a similar point about the relationship between equity and debt finance, see

CHARLES W. CALOMIRlS, U . S . BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 248

(2000). Specifically, Calomiris notes that equity sometimes may "not be a feasible alternative
to debt, either because the costs of resolving asymmetric information b etween firms and

equrty holder is unal:>le to exert control
Id. Notice that the argument in the text is not inconsistent with

ultimate sources of funds are large . . . or b ecause the
over corporate management."

the fact that liquid stock markets seem to be developing before bond markets in several
European countries whose corporate governance has traditionally been characterized by
concentrated ownership: In these countries, such as Germany and France, there tS
longer tradition of market investment.

a

much
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, 1 63
In contrast to securities markets, moreover, which may be
markets] . ,
entirely lacking, most developing and transition countries have at least an
64
embryonic banking system to serve as a starting pOi!lt. 1
The experience with privatization in Eastern Europe underscores the
case for focusing on bond markets or bank lending rather than stock. As
recounted by Erik B erglOf and Patrick Bolton, the "number of firms
listed on [the Czech, S lovak, Lithuanian, and Romanian] stock
exchanges increased dramatically" shortly after reforms were
implemented, "but after an initial phase of high trade volumes, most
,
stocks became and remained i lliquid. , 1 65 Within a few years, stock
ownership in most companies was once again highly concentrated, stock
changed hands relatively infrequently, and corporate finance in the most
successful jurisdictions was dominated by bank lending. 1 66
Rather than trying to create a liquid stock market from scratch, debt
finance, together with manager-displacing bankruptcy, is a more
plausible starting point for reform in these countries. This suggests that
the most important agency cost issues may stern from the relationship
between lenders and the firm, and that creditor protection should take
precedence over efforts to enhance the rights of minority shareholders as
the focus of future reforms . 1 67 In the bankruptcy context, efforts to
reduce the information asymmetries between principal bank lenders and
other creditors should take center stage, given the risk that well
positioned bank lenders may divert value from small creditors.
There is another point as well , a lesson that takes us back to the heart
of The Anatomy of Corporate Law. The book provides a framework for
understanding the issues that are inherent to the corporation, and thus
common to every j urisdiction; this Review has attempted to develop the
authors ' analysis into a more fully functional perspective on corporate
law . But this framework cannot substitute for the hard work of

1 6 3 . Pistor et aI ., supra note 1 56, at 327.
1 64 . Id. As discussed in Section IILB, firms that borrow from banks, and thus have
concentrated debt in their capital structure, are likely to have concentrated stock ownership a s
welL Although stock markets will often be illiquid under these circumstances, there have been
at least a few exceptions to this tendency. In the l ate nineteenth and early twentieth century,
German corporate finance seems to have been characterized by both bank finance and an
active stock market. See, e.g., CALOMIRlS, supra note 1 62 , at 24 1 -50 (describing the role of
banks and equity, and the relative dearth of bond finance, in pre-World War I Germany).
1 65 . Erik BerglOf & Patrick Bolton, The Great Divide and Beyond. Financial
Architecture in Transition, J. Eco . PERS P . , Winter 2002, at 77, 86.
1 66. Id. -at 87.
1 67. See, e.g., Pistor et aI., supra note 1 5 6, at 327.
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understanding the peculiar institutional dynamics of any given
developing or transition jurisdiction. The framework can help reformers
determine what questions to ask, but the most effective reforms are likely
to be those that are sensitive to jurisdiction-specific nuances such as the
institutions that are already in place.
CONCLUSION
As I noted at the outset, The Anatomy of Corporate Law is the most
important corporate law book of the decade. This Review has offered
several friendly amendments to the authors ' analysis. I have argued that
they should add chapters on bankruptcy and corporate groups , and
expand the epilogue to consider the extent to which their framework does
and does not apply to corporate governance in developing nations. But
these adjustments do not detract in any way from the importance of the
authors' underlying schema. The ten-part typology of The Anatomy of
Corporate Law will provide the next generation of corporate law
scholars and policymakers with a framework for understanding the
characteristic dilemmas of corporate enterprise. For comparative
corporate law scholarship, the future starts here.

